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Research indicates that between 36-40% of people are afraid to visit the dentist, 20%
are highly anxious and 5% avoid dental treatments due to severe anxiety (Lindsay &
Jackson, 1993). Dental anxiety is known to be a major barrier to optimal health care
with individuals fearful of impending invasive procedures often presenting only when
in severe pain. Dental anxiety has been found to be based on past memories of
experiences of pain and loss of control in the dental setting.
Evidence from the literature suggests that some individuals with dental anxiety also
present with additional psychological problems, such as panic disorder. De Jongh,
Muris, ter Horst and Duyx (1995) also reported that individuals with dental anxiety
also exhibited more catastrophizing thoughts related to dental treatment. A recent
study by De Jongh, Aartman & Brand (manuscript submitted for publication) reported
that intrusive memories of past distressing dental experiences were associated with
trauma-related symptoms. However no structured assessment for Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) was carried out.
This study aimed to identify the association between intrusive memories related to
dental experiences and trauma-related symptomatology and to investigate differences
in psychopathology and frequency of thought content in individuals presenting with
and without intrusive memories. The proportion of individuals with intrusive
memories who would meet criteria for PTSD was also investigated. Results will be
given and conclusions reached.
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Chapter 1. Dental Anxiety
Dental anxiety is a major barrier to optimal oral health care with patients fearful of
impending invasive procedures often presenting only when in severe pain. Dental
anxiety can also interfere with dental treatment compliance and make control of pain
and completion of treatment difficult for the patient and the dental practitioner
(Walker & Cooper, 1998).
1.1 Characteristics ofDental Anxiety
Fear of the dentist is experienced to varying degrees. Research indicates that between
36-40 per cent of people are afraid to visit the dentist, 20 per cent are highly anxious
and 5 per cent avoid dental treatments due to severe anxiety (Lindsay & Jackson,
1993, Stouthard & Hoogstraten, 1990). However the true extent of dental anxiety is
unknown as many of those with difficulties either avoid treatment or only attend for
symptomatic care (McGoldrick, Levitt, De Jongh, Mason & Evans, submitted for
publication). A recent adult dental health survey carried out in the United Kingdom
reported that amongst dentate adults 23 per cent of men and 40 per cent of women
reported being "definitely nervous" of some types of dental treatment (Walker &
Cooper, 1998). In a review of behavioural research in dentistry between 1987-1992,
ter Horst and de Wit (1993) found that women reporting more dental anxiety than
men was almost universal. Liddell & Locker (1993) reported that dental anxiety
peaks during early adolescence and declines with increasing age.
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Dental anxiety is frequently based on past memories of experiences of pain and loss
of control in the dental setting (Kent, 1987; Mazey & Mito, 1993). Locker, Shapiro
and Liddell (1996) found that negative dental experiences, in particular, painful
experiences, were related to dental anxiety. McNeil and Berryman (1989) reported
that pain, mutilation and being closed-in were found to be three of the most
important components of dental anxiety. A study carried out by Rice and Liddell
(1998) also found that discomfort, pain and invasive procedures were most often
identified as reasons for negative attitudes towards dentistry.
The dentist-patient relationship has also been identified as a factor contributing to the
aetiology and maintenance of dental anxiety. Bernstein, Kleinknecht and Alexander
(1979) reported that amongst a sample of high-dental fear students, half of the group
cited the perceived manner of the dentist as a factor accounting for their present
fears. Kent (1998) suggested that this study appears to show that the manner of the
dentist may have an independent effect on the students' feelings. Cold or
uninterested behaviour was enough to make some students feel negatively about
dentistry, whereas caring and warm behaviour displayed by the dentist could have an
interactive effect and obviate the long-term effects of painful experiences. Milgrom,
Vignehsa and Weinstein (1992) found that adolescents were more likely to be highly
anxious of dental treatment if they believed that their dentist was unsympathetic. In a
study carried out by Weiner, Forgione, Weiner and Hwang (2000) dentists who were
rated as exhibiting a variety of negative behaviours and attitudes were more likely to
increase levels of concern in patients. The authors argue that negative dental
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practitioner behaviours may act as fear-provoking stimuli, leading to increased fear
and avoidance of dental treatment.
Milgrom, Weinstein and Getz (1995) describe approach-avoidance conflicts
operating in individuals with dental phobia. Based on Dollard & Miller's (1950)
work, they describe conflicts between the consequences of neglecting dental care and
the anxiety associated with attending. According to this model the patient is faced
with two competing tendencies with respect to a single situation i.e. motivated to
approach the dentist, yet also wanting to avoid the experience. This creates a state of
conflict. Dollard and Miller (1950) suggested that these two tendencies change in
strength as the person in conflict moves closer or further away from the desired but
feared situation. If further away in time and distance the approach tendency is
stronger than the avoidance. As the appointment time approaches the patient
becomes more anxious and the avoidance tendency is stronger than the approach
tendency. Milgrom et al (1985) argue that this approach-avoidance relationship may
explain why some patients make appointments then cancel them close to the
appointment time.
The most serious degree of dental fear is specific phobia (Moore, Brodsgaard & Birn
(1991). These patients are known to avoid the dentist for many years and the
avoidance of dental treatment is strongly associated with extreme deterioration of
oral health (Cohen, 1985). A recent qualitative study (Cohen, Fiske, & Newton,
2000) also found that patients with severe dental anxiety reported problems with both
family and workplace relationships. These patients described loss of authority at
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work following disclosing their dental anxiety to work colleagues and poor job
interview performance because of impaired speech. They also described difficulties
in the development and maintenance of family relationships. The authors note that
health is more than the absence of clinical disease and also involves the ability to eat,
speak and socialise without feeling discomfort or embarrassment. A study by
Nuttall, Steele, Pine, White and Pitts (2001) found that in a population of 6,204
adults over half (51 per cent) reported that they had been affected by their oral health.
The authors found that in the 12 months preceding the study the most commonly
experienced impact on quality of life was oral pain. The next most frequently
experienced problems arising from oral condition were found to be psychological.
These included feeling tense, self-conscious and embarrassed about their oral
condition. Eight per cent of those in the study reported that they had been severely
affected by their oral health in that they felt their life was less satisfying or that they
were totally unable to function at some time in the preceding year as a result of their
oral condition.
De Jongh, Bongaarts, Vermeule, Visser, De Vos and Makkes (1998) reported that in
reviews of the dental literature, dental fears and blood-injury-injection (Bit) phobia
are often dealt with together. Edelman (1992) suggests that dental phobia is a
subtype of blood-injury phobia. However a number of studies have found that dental
phobia should be considered as independent of BII phobia (De Jongh et al 1998;
Locker, Shapiro & Liddell, 1997). Dental phobics were found to demonstrate fear of
specific dental stimuli or procedures and more general aspects of the dental treatment
situation i.e. anticipation of encounters with specific dental-related stimuli, loss of
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control in the dental setting and pain. They were found to endorse less BII fears such
as an excessive fear of blood and injections (De Jongh et al 1998).
Kent, Rubin, Getz and Humphries (1996) designed a scale to assess the social and
psychological effects of dental phobia. They found that dental phobics were more
likely to endorse items, which indicated social and cognitive consequences e.g. "7
feel thai people will laugh at me ifI tell them about my fears about dentistry" and
"the need to see a dentist is constantly on my mind".
There is evidence from the literature that patients presenting with dental fears are not
a homogeneous group (Liddell and Gosse 1998). It has been reported that some
patients presenting with high dental anxiety may also have other psychological
difficulties such as multiple phobias, panic disorder, and general anxiety disorder
(Aartman, 2000, Roy-Byrne, Milgrom, Khoon-Mei, Weinstein & Katon, 1994).
Kaaklo, Coldwell, Getz, Milgrom, Roy-Byrne & Ramsay al (2000) reported that
amongst a group of patients with dental injection phobia, over half had an additional
current Axis I diagnosis other than dental injection phobia, mainly anxiety, mood or
adjustment disorder. Subjects presenting with additional Axis I diagnoses reported
higher dental anxiety, greater severity of injection fear cognitions and poorer
relationships with dental professional. Kaaklo et al (2000) suggest that further
investigations are required to explore the treatment possibilities for patients with and
without additional current diagnoses.
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Milgrom, Weinstein, Kleinknecht and Getz (1985) developed an aetiological
categorisation system (The Seattle System) to explain dental anxiety. The four
categories were 1) conditioned fear of specific dental stimuli; 2) anxiety about
somatic reactions during treatment e.g. panic attacks, an allergic reaction; 3)trait
anxiety or multiphobic symptoms and 4) distrust of dental personnel. However the
authors did not make clear how the last three categories could have their aetiological
basis explained. It is possible that a conditioned fear response could account for
categories two, three and four. For example, Davey (1992) suggests that panic
disorder may be acquired as a result from the conditioning of panic to either internal
stimuli (dizziness) or external stimuli (situation). Speirs and Barsby (1995) reported
that hyperventilation is common amongst the dentally anxious population whilst in a
dental setting. Dizziness is known to be an effect of hyperventilation, therefore it is
conceivable that panic disorder could be conditioned in this situation. In addition
Weiner et al (2000) have proposed that dental practitioner behaviours may act to
provoke fear responses accounting for the development of the fourth category in
Milgrom et al's (1985) categorisation.
Moore et al (1991) used the Seattle System of classification to reflect DSM-III-R
(APA, 1982) diagnostic categorisation then subsequently DSM-1V (APA,1987,1994)
categorisation with patients presenting with dental anxiety. They found that the
existence of multiple phobias and general anxiety complicated the presentation of
dental fear in about one third of their patients. They also found that the majority of
the patients in the study suffered from social embarrassment about their dental fear
and their inability to do something about it.
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In a study carried out by Roy-Byrne, Milgrom, Khoon-Mei, Weinstein and Katon
(1994) 60 per cent of their dentally anxious patients were found to have a simple
dental phobia, whilst the rest of their sample presented with anxiety-based or mood
disorders according to DSM-III-R criteria (APA, 1982). They also found that half of
the individuals who presented with the diagnosis of simple phobia had a past
psychiatric history.
Enneking, Milgrom, Weinstein and Getz (1992) found that patients presenting with
non-specific dental fears (all stimuli including making a dental appointment are seen
as terrifying) compared to patients with specific dental fears (injection) reported
more concerns about a medical catastrophe during dental treatment and were more
likely to relapse. It was observed that the non-specific patient group reflected
symptoms and behaviours more readily associated with generalised anxiety disorder,
such as being easily fatigued, sleep disturbances and irritability.
Berggren & Carlsson (1985) and Moore, (1991) argued that dentally anxious patients
presenting with other psychological difficulties have greater difficulties in treatment
than individuals presenting with specific dental anxiety. Berggren and Carlsson
(1985) found that patients with dental anxiety who were also anxious about a number
of situations and objects (not dentally related) were less likely to benefit from
behavioural therapy that those who presented with a specific dental anxiety.
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In summary, the extent of dental anxiety in the population is reported to be unknown.
However where the problem is identified the literature suggests that it has serious
consequences on health, social and workplace relationships. For some individuals
with dental anxiety, additional psychological difficulties have been identified. It is
not clear from the literature if these additional psychological difficulties develop as a
consequence of the dental anxiety e.g. self-consciousness, increased tension (Nuttall,
et al, 2001), poor family relationships (Cohen et al, 2000), or that dental anxiety
develops in individuals predisposed to the development of general psychological
disorders. It has been proposed that additional psychological difficulties presenting
with dental anxiety leads to difficulties in treatment intervention. The next section
discusses the treatment of dental anxiety and the types ofmethods used.
1.2 Treating Dental Anxiety
Various treatments exist for patients with anxiety, however according to McGoldrick
& Durham, (2000) psychological therapies are reported to have been applied less to
dental anxiety relative to other anxiety disorders. The various treatments that have
been implemented in the treatment of dental anxiety include psychological
treatments such as, cognitive behavioural therapies (De Jongh, Muris, ter Horst &
Duyx 1995a), and pharmacotherapy, such as conscious sedation with nitrous oxide,
intravenous sedation with one or more sedative drugs and general anaesthesia
(Kaufman & Jastik, 1995). A recent study by McGoldrick et al (manuscript
submitted for publication) found that referrals to a dental anxiety clinic were more
likely to have been for pharmacological intervention than psychological
management. However for the majority of patients receiving pharmacological
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treatment, re-referral was common, suggesting that the application of this type of
treatment had only short-term benefits. The authors argue that due to the amnesic
effects of the drugs given during intravenous sedation, habituation of the anxiety
response does not take place. The patients then will have had no opportunity to
increase self-efficacy and build confidence to cope with future dental procedures.
According to Aartman (2000) the results of studies carried out comparing
pharmacological versus psychological interventions are inconclusive, although there
has been a slight advantage reported for the behavioural interventions. A number of
studies have reported a decrease in post-treatment dental anxiety scores following
behavioural interventions (Milgrom et al 1995, Hakeberg, Berggren & Carlsson
1990).
Johren, Jackowsky, Gangler, Satory and Thorn (2000) carried out a clinical trial to
examine short and medium tenn reduction of dental fear in patients with dental
phobia who were requiring oral surgery. Groups were compared between one-session
psychological treatment (stress management training and imaginal exposure), oral
sedation (phannocological) and control group (no intervention). Following
intervention and prior to surgery both interventions caused the level of reported
dental fear to decrease compared to the control group. At follow-up two months later
the oral sedation group showed a return to reported baseline fear level whereas the
psychologically treated group showed further improvement. At one year follow-up
only the group who had received psychological treatment reported sustained
reduction of levels of fear.
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Studies which have examined the process of providing the dental phobic patient with
a means of control during dental procedures have also been found to be successful
(Kent, 1998). Various procedures have been used such as information (Thrash, Marx
and Box, 1982) and stop signals (Wardle, 1983). Stop signals e.g. raising a hand,
have been used as a control mechanism. Milgrom et al (1995) reported that where the
patient can indicate to the dentist to stop treatment at a particular point this increases
the patient's control, thus reducing the patient's helplessness in the dental situation.
Milgrom et al (1995) argue that the patients perception of control is critical for
successful intervention. This is in accord with Bandura's (1982) argument that
successive treatments are those where control and self-efficacy are enhanced. Litt,
Nye and Shafer (1993) compared a self-efficacy group (given false feedback about
their ability to relax) and a relaxation group. The self-efficacy group, were found to
have increased beliefs in their ability to cope with dental procedures, it was also
found that staffs blind ratings of distress during the procedure were less for the self-
efficacy group than the relaxation group.
Currently McGoldrick and Durham (2001) are conducting a systematic Cochrane
review of psychotherapy-based treatments for dental anxiety, as there are no
authoritative guidelines currently available to inform rational clinical decision
making in this area.
to
1.3 A General Overview ofFear Acquisition, Development andMaintenance.
Conditioning Models:
Before considering the acquisition, development and maintenance of dental fears1
dental anxiety and its variants, a brief background of general fear acquisition and
maintenance will be presented.
The acquisition of human fears have mostly been explained in terms of conditioning
models and can be traced back to the work of Pavlov (1927). Classical conditioning
is a process whereby associating a Conditioned Stimulus (CS) with an Unconditioned
Stimulus (UCS) results in a Conditioned Response (CR) to the Conditioned Stimulus
(CS). In their most rudimentary form Pavlovian conditioning accounts maintain that
fear is a conditioned emotional response (CER) to a stimulus or event that is acquired
via pairings with an aversive or traumatic unconditioned stimulus (UCS) (Forsyth,
Daleiden & Chorpita, 2000; Rescorla, 1988,).
Watson and Raynor (1920) paired a pet rat (the conditioned stimulus, CS) with a
loud noise (the unconditioned stimulus, UCS) in an attempt to condition a fear of the
rat in an 11 -month boy. They reported that the boy would begin to cry (the
conditioned response, CR) when the rat was introduced to the room. Davey (1997)
1
(Rachman (1998) draws a distinction behveen the terms anxiety andfear. He describes anxiety as
the tense anticipation ofa threatening but vague event, where the person has difficulty in
identifying the cause ofthe uneasy tension. Fear he describes as a combination oftension and
unpleasant anticipation where the emotional reaction is to a specific perceived danger. However he
does go on to suggest that the distinction between fear and anxiety especially in clinical terms may
not be readily discernible. Often the terms anxiety andphobias are used to describe the same
psychological problem Le. social anxiety/social phobia even where there is a specificfocus to the
problem. Authors often use the terms, fear and anxiety interchangeably andfor this thesis the terms
used by the original authors will be used so as not to change the emphasis oftheir work.
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reports that a series of failures to replicate this study led to scepticism about the
usefulness of conditioning models.
However according to Menzies and Clarke (1995) an instrumental contingency
existed between Little Albert's behaviour and the presentation of the loud noise. The
noise was only presented when Albert reached out and touched the rat. Menzies and
Clark (1995) argue that it was not until Mowrer's (1939) extension of Watson and
Raynor's account that instrumental learning was seen to take an important role in the
development and maintenance of phobias.
Mowrer's (1939) two-stage theory of anxiety was influential in the acceptance of
conditioning as an important factor in fear acquisition. Mowrer believed that anxiety
was a learned response, which occurred to conditioned stimuli that have been
followed by situations of pain or injury (UCS). He argued that fear would motivate
humans to avoid these situations, and that the reduction of fear would serve to
reinforce behaviours such as avoidance as it would bring about a sense of relief. For
Mowrer the initial acquisition of fear was due to Pavlovian conditioning. Laboratory
research carried out by Malloy and Levis (1988) lends support to Mowrer's two-
stage theory. They found that, when pairings of light (CS) and shock (UCS) are
given, followed by an opportunity to react with an escape response, persistent
avoidance behaviour occurs.
A number of important features have evolved from the conditioning model. It was
believed that neutral stimuli associated with fear or pain developed to become fearful
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conditioned stimuli. The number of repetitions was believed to strengthen the fear as
was the intensity of the fear or pain experienced in the presence of the stimuli. This
model also highlighted temporal contiguity between the CS and UCS.
The conditioning theory was supported by a number of sources. A vast number of
experiments were carried out on laboratory animals where fear reactions were
generated by exposing animals to neutral and aversive stimuli. After a few pairings
of an innocuous CS (usually a light or tone) and a noxious UCS (such as a brief
shock to the feet) a constellation of CRs, characteristic of fear, (changes in heart rate
and arterial blood pressure, somatosensory immobility, potentiated acoustic startle
and pupillary dilation) have been observed when the CS is presented alone (Maren &
Fanselow, 1996).
In humans fear reactions have been observed under combat conditions where the fear
has resulted from traumatic stimulation (Rachman 1998). Sanderson, Laverty &
Campbell (1963) conducted an experiment in which subjects were given a drug,
which produced a temporary suspension of breathing. Most of the subjects were
found to have developed intense fears of the stimulus encountered in or connected
with the setting where they received the drug.
However although it was generally believed that the conditioning model could
explain fear acquisition, a number of problems were identified that the model could
not adequately demonstrate.
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Davey (1997) argues that one of the major criticisms of the conditioning model of
phobias is that a simple contiguity-based model does not appear to have the power to
predict the acquisition of a phobia. It is now recognised that conditioned responses
can develop when the CS and UCS are separated in time (Rachman, 1998).
Observations of non-contiguous conditioning have been reported from experiments
in food aversions. Animals given a novel food then made ill minutes or even hours
later can form a strong aversion to the food (Garcia & Koelling, 1966).
Menzies and Clark (1995) report that one of the common attacks on the classical
conditioning account is on the infrequency of one-trial learning in the laboratory.
Seligman (1971) argued that one-trial learning may explain the acute onset of many
phobias and may be obtained if extremely traumatic UCSs are employed. However
Sturgis and Scott (1984) and Eysenck (1979) claim that one-trial learning is rare in
laboratory studies. Recent work by Marks (1987) however did find that conditioning
of skin conductance could be obtained in a single trial using relatively mild electric
shock and a variety ofCSs.
Rachman (1977) and Emmelkamp (1982) reported that many people who present
with phobias are unable to recall any aversive or traumatic experience at the onset of
their phobia. It has also been observed that not all people who experience a traumatic
experience develop subsequent fears (Aitkin, Lister & Main, 1981). Hallam and
Rachman (1976) conducted a study involving an electrical UCS, which they
predicted would result in the development of a conditioned fear reaction. One group
received 205 shock trials over ten sessions and another group received 20 shocks
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during a single session. The authors failed to confirm their hypothesis. Therefore
neither the number of repetitions of the UCS or intensity of the UCS produced a fear
reaction. This being contrary to the original conditioning model which suggested that
both the number of repetitions and the intensity of the UCS strengthen the
conditioned response.
Incubation, where fear increases over non-reinforced presentations of the CS is noted
to occur frequently in clinical populations (Eysenck, 1979). It has not been reported
to occur as frequently in laboratory experiments. The Sanderson et al (1963) study is
reported to be one of the few examples of laboratory fear incubation (Rachman,
1998). The conditioning model would not predict incubation, where an unreinforced
presentation of the CS would be expected to produce a decrement in fear. Therefore
it is possible that in the clinical population, some other processes may influence an
increase in fear. This issue will be further discussed in section 1.4, in the discussion
of contemporary models of conditioning.
Davey (1997) also raises the problem with the conditioning model where it assumes
that all stimuli can be transformed into a fear signal. The assumption of
equipotentiality (Seligman & Hager, 1972) has not been found in either general
population or psychiatric studies (Rachman, 1990). Davey (1997) reported that
people tend to develop phobias of animals, heights and water more readily than fears
of knives, electric outlets and guns. Menzies and Clark (1995) observe that the
distribution of phobias consists of objects or situations that represent serious dangers
to pretechnical rather than modern man. Therefore these fears may have served an
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adaptive function to our ancestors, and are now part of our evolutionary biological
inheritance.
It has also been suggested that phobias can be acquired through vicarious
transmission of fear. Bandura (1969) demonstrated that both the processes of
observational learning and modelling could influence emotional responses. Rachman
(1968) proposed that fears could be acquired either directly or indirectly (vicarious
transmission and transmission of information). He proposed that severe fears were
acquired through direct conditioning and moderate fears through indirect
conditioning. He further proposed that the anxiety correlates of fear would differ
with direct conditioning experiences having more behavioural and physiological
correlates and indirect conditioning experiences having elevated cognitive correlates,
such as higher levels of negative cognitions (Rachman, 1976).
Rachman (1977) proposes evidence for indirect conditioning obtained from the
second world war. it was observed that children were more likely to develop fears if
their mothers were also fearful. More recently Ost (1987) reported that the second
most common pathway to fear was vicarious (observing) experiences and the least
common was via instruction/transmission of information in a group of patients
referred with different phobias. Ost (1987) noted that phobias acquired through the
least common method were acquired at an earlier age. Ollendick and King (1991)
also found that childhood fears were often acquired from threatening information.
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In a series of studies Mineka and Cook (1993) reported that laboratory reared rhesus
monkeys that did not initially exhibit a fear of snakes acquired an intense and
persistent fear of snakes after several sessions of watching models (monkeys that
exhibited an intense fear of snakes). However the authors report that it is not clear
what mechanisms are involved in the process of fear acquisition mediated by
observational learning.
According to Mineka and Cook (1993) the mechanisms of observational learning
might not be very different from those thought to be involved in direct conditioning.
Bandura (1969) argued that both direct and vicarious conditioning processes are
governed by the same basic principles of associative learning, but that they differ in
the source of emotional arousal.
Ost and Hugdahl (1981) offer support for Rachman's (1977) hypothesis that phobias
could be acquired through both direct and indirect pathways (vicarious and
instruction/information). They found evidence for direct and indirect conditioning
pathways. In studies examining several clinical groups (animal phobics, social
phobics and claustrophobics, blood and dental phobics). Ost and Hugdahl (1985)
found all three pathways could account for the acquisition of phobias. In all their
studies however they found that the number of directly conditioned cases to be
significantly higher than those who identified indirect pathways to account for their
fears.
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However Menzies and Clarke (1995) report that only amongst the animal phobics
(direct conditioning group) in Ost and Hugdahls (1981) work was there a difference
in severity of anxiety between direct and indirect conditioning pathways of fear
acquisition. The animal phobics (direct conditioning) reported higher physiological
reactions compared to subjective reactions when in the presence of the fearful object.
Amongst the social and claustrophobic groups higher scores were observed on the
subjective components (negative thoughts and anticipator}' worry) irrespective of the
acquired pathway. The claustrophobic indirect group, were also found to have the
strongest behavioural reaction (time enclosed in a small test chamber and measure of
heart-rate). This finding being contrary to Rachman's (1977) hypothesis, which
suggests that the indirectly conditioned group would have displayed a less stronger
behavioural reaction than the directly conditioned group.
Menzies and Clark (1995) argue that more research is required in relation to other
phobias to test Rachman's hypothesis further.
In summary, classical conditioning has been recognised as one of the main theories
to explain fear acquisition and can account for the motivating behaviour that reduces
the strength of that fear. Much of the research to support this came from animal
research, with some evidence coming from human research and the effects of
traumatic stimulation. However a number of problems have been identified with the
classical conditioning theory, such as its lack of predictive value as to the conditions
under which a phobia would not be acquired, and the lack of recall of an aversive
experience that would explain the fear. The classical conditioning approach was also
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unable to explain the process of incubation, and the uneven distribution of fears
breaches the view that all stimuli can be transformed into a fear signal. Alternative
learning routes to fear acquisition have also been identified. These difficulties have
led to the development of a contemporary model of conditioning, which is discussed
in the next section.
1.4 Contemporary Model ofConditionins:
A recent contemporary model of conditioning has been proposed (Davey 1992).
Davey (1992) argues that humans only exhibit a differential CR when they are able
to verbalise the CS-UCS contingency (exhibit contingency awareness). He points to
research findings where the relationship between the CS and UCS is masked (by
distraction), and subjects fail to exhibit a conditioning response. Davey (1992)
suggests that this implies a type of "cognitive relational learning".
Davey (1989) has also argued that UCS revaluation may also have considerable
importance in the modulation of human CR strength. He argues that UCS revaluation
may be achieved by direct experience, for example an individual may reassess an
aversive UCS more favourably, through, habituation. UCS revaluation may also be
inflated, due to experiencing a similar UCS of greater intensity. White and Davey
(1989) manipulated UCS evaluation in an electrodermal conditioning task, by
inflating the UCS. After pairings of CS-UCS, the tone UCS was inflated by exposing
the participants to similar tones of increased intensity. Presentations of the CS,
subsequent to this resulted in an increased magnitude CR. The authors argue that the
CR was mediated by a CS-UCS associative link.
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Davey (1992) also argues that the UCS can be revaluated by socially or verbally
transmitted information. Davey and Mckenna (1983) found that informing
participants that future UCS presentations would be less intense, elicited weaker CR
responses (electrodermal).
Another way in which the UCS can be evaluated is the persons reaction to the CS or
UCS (Davey, 1992). Davey (1989) and Russell and Davey (1991) found that when
participants believed they were emitting a strong CR, when they are not (false
feedback), they exhibit a resistance to extinction compared to subjects who believe
they are emitting a weak CR.
Other factors which can influence the CS-UCS relationship have been identified as
situational information (current information about the contingency) and prior
expectations about the covariation. Alloy and Tabachnik (1984) found that where
situational information is unambiguous and prior expectations are low, participants
could detect event contingencies accurately. However a covariation bias can arise
which distorts the perception of the covariation (Davey, 1992). Davey (1992) argues
that covariation bias is important as it shows that the relationship between CS-UCS
need not depend solely on the situational information contained in the CS-UCS
contingency, but critically may depend as much on any prior expectation that the
subject holds about the stimuli. According to Davey (1992) this may explain why not
all stimuli can be transformed into a fear signal. Tomarken, Minelka and Cook
(1989) argue that the distribution of fears to certain objects (prepared stimuli- see
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section 1.6) may be due to covariation bias. In an experiment they exposed
participants to slides of prepared and unprepared stimuli which was followed by
shock, tone or nothing. The relationship between the slides and outcome were
random however the participants overestimated the contingency between slides of
prepared stimuli and shock. It is suggested that this experiment provides evidence
that prior expectations influence the strength or course of conditioning in humans by
generating a covariation bias which influences perception of the CS-UCS
relationship (Davey, 1992). However Davey was unable to conclude as to the source
of the expectancy bias and argues that it may be "pre-wired" as a result of natural
selection (this is similar to Seligman's argument see section 1.6).
Sensory preconditioning is another factor, which according to Davey (1992) can
influence the CS-UCS contingency. In animal studies, when as animal is exposed to
pairings of two neutral stimuli e.g. brief light (CS1) followed by a tone (CS2), there
are no behavioural changes noted. However if the animal is then given pairings of
CS2 with a UCS, subsequent presentation of CS1 alone will elicit a CR (Davey,
1992). Dickinson (1980) refers to this as behaviourally silent learning as it is only
with further tests that it becomes known that learning occurred in the initial part of
the procedure.
Davey (1992) argues that these factors can help explain the problems encountered by
the classical conditioning model. He suggests that the lack of predictive value can be
accounted for by UCS evaluation. As CRs are mediated by an internal representation
of the UCS, the strength of any CR will depend on the individual's evaluation of the
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UCS. The conditioning experience may not result in a fear CR if the individual is
able to devalue the aversiveness of the traumatic experience. The contemporary
conditioning theory would therefore predict that pairings of a situation with trauma
would not necessarily lead to a phobia if the traumatic UCS were devalued in some
way immediately after the experience (Davey, 1992).
Davey (1992) also argues that sensory preconditioning can explain why some
individuals appear unable to recall any trauma at the time of the first appearance of
their fear to the phobic stimulus. He argues that it is conceivable for an individual to
learn an association between a CS and UCS when the UCS is unaversive (sensory
preconditioning). At a later stage through UCS revaluation the aversiveness of the
UCS may become inflated subsequently.
The contemporary conditioning model is also believed to be able to account for
incubation effects. Davey (1992) argues that evaluation of the CR can be influenced
by the evaluation of the UCS, specifically through inflation occurring between
successive presentations of the CS. UCS rehearsal is one way in which he suggests
that the process of incubation can occur. Marks (1987) has, reported that following a
trauma, many individuals rehearse the event in their minds. Davey (1992) argues that
rehearsal could lead to inflation of the UCS prior to subsequent encounters with the
CS.
Davey (1992) also argues that his model can explain why fears appear to attach to
some events and situations and not others. His explanation for this is based on the
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findings that the CS-UCS relationship can be determined by pre-existing beliefs. The
uneven distribution of fears will be based on outcome expectancy biases, if beliefs
about the relationships between certain events and traumatic outcomes are held,
expectancy biases according to Davey (1982) will operate to produce an uneven
distribution of fears.
Davey's (1992) analysis also considers direct and indirect acquisition processes.
Indirect conditioning is known to influence behaviour by producing outcome
expectancies (Bandura, 1977). As has already been identified outcome expectancies
have an important role in covariation and in determining the strength of the
conditioned responses. Therefore according to the contemporary model indirect
experiences may influence the nature of learning when the individual does not
encounter a direct experience. Expectancies can also produce differential CRs in the
absence of a direct experience with an UCS, therefore the nature of the CR will
depend on the information encoded in the activated UCS representation (Davey,
1992). According to Davey (1992) direct and indirect conditioning are functionally
and dynamically similar. He argues that they obey similar associative rules, but differ
only to the extent to which they are different learning procedures (direct experience
with an UCS may encode different information into a UCS representation than an
indirect experience, with this information influencing the strength of the CR).
However Davey (1992) does suggest that more work is required on the relationship
between direct and indirect conditioning, especially measures of response strength
and persistence and the nature and content of the UCS representations generated by
both types of learning.
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In summary the contemporary conditioning model appears to offer explanations to
account for the limitations found in the classical conditioning literature. Individuals
presenting with anxiety disorders are known to present with cognitive biases centred
around threat and harm (Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985) therefore it is conceivable
that these biases could account for inflation of the UCS through revaluation.
1.5 The Panic andAlarm Theory ofFearAcquisition:
According to the panic and alarm theory of fear acquisition, exposure to an
environmental UCS is neither necessary nor sufficient for fear conditioning (Forsyth
& Eifert, 1995). Barlow (1988) describes fear as a biological response, which can be
described in terms of true, false and learned alarms. True alarms are derived from the
biological "fight or flight" mechanism. These responses are associated with increased
oxygen intake and increased blood flow. They are also associated with verbal
evaluations of harm or threat. False alarms are believed to occur in the absence of
real harm or threat. Barlow, Brown and Craske (1994) describe panic attacks as a
common example of false alarms. Panic attacks in anxiety disorders are a central
defining diagnostic feature according to DSM-1V diagnosis criteria.
Barlow (1988) suggests that the repeated occurrence of false alarms may result in
learned alarms through their association with an internal or external cue. It has been
suggested that learned alarms may become associated with interoceptive cues (the
perception of events within the body, such as nausea, vertigo and visceral sensations)
through a process of interoceptive conditioning. This applies to a learned relation
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between internal somatic cues and other sensations of the alarm response (Forsyth
and Eifert 1995).
Forsyth and Eifert (1995) suggest that the type of conditioning relevant to phobias
may be exteroinceptive (an environmental CS and an interoceptive UCS).
Merckelbach, Ruiter, van den Hout and Floekstra (1989) suggested that all
conditioning experiences consisted of frightful internal bodily sensations. McNally
and Steketee (1985) reported that amongst a group of animal phobics it was not the
fear of the animal per se but the consequences that the animal had come to represent,
specifically aversive bodily sensations and panic. According to McNally and
Lukaach (1992) these aversive bodily sensations are capable of producing Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) like symptoms in some patients.
Forsyth, Eifert and Thomson (1996) have reported preliminary data, which they
argue provides experimental support that abrupt, autonomic bodily responses can
produce, fear conditioning in the absence of an identifiable direct experience with
environmental pain or trauma. They developed an interoexteroceptive conditioning
preparation using high concentrations of CO2 enriched air (the psychophysiological
effects of breathing C02 are characteristic of patients with panic disorder e.g.
tachycardia, breathlessness, dizziness) paired with animated environmental and
bodily video stimuli. This is in contrast to the exterexteroceptive type that involves
pairings of environmental CSs and environmental UCSs such as shock or noise. In
their study they demonstrated that repeated pairings of 20sec inhalations of 20 per
cent CO2 enriched air (UCS) produced abrupt autonomic responses in normals with
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changes in self-reported distress and fear (electrodermal and cardiac domains) to fear
relevant stimuli (snake and heart) compared to fear irrelevant (flowers and sperm)
CSs. They argued that this study provided experimental support for the view that
anxiogenic responses can produce fear conditioning in the absence of an identifiable
direct experience with pain or trauma. Forsyth et al (1996) also observed that
participants who showed little response to the UCS also showed little evidence of
conditioning. This observation was taken to highlight that the presence of a
nonthreatening stimulus (NS)-UCS pairing was not sufficient to produce
conditioning (as suggested by the original Pavlovian model). It was therefore
suggested that response (UCR) intensity may be an important factor to consider in
accounting for individual differences in fear conditioning (Forsyth et al, 2000). The
authors point out however that they are not implying that a UCS is not involved in
conditioning but that they dispute findings that an identifiable UCS is the only
evidence for direct conditioning.
Forsyth et al (2000) further examined the UCS-UCR intensity responses by using
two UCS intensities (13 per cent and 20 per cent CO2) paired with the following CSs
(snake, heart and flowers). It was hypothesised that individual differences in
response intensity would account for more of the variance in fear conditioning than
UCS intensity. The UCR was expected to mediate the UCS CR relation
(Forsyth et al, 2000). It was found that greater UCR intensity predicted greater
conditioned fear, this effect was found to be robust across response domains and CSs
(snakes and heart). The authors argue that this finding may explain why some
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individuals develop PTSD and others do not when exposed to the same traumatic
event.
1.6 Evolutionary Models ofFear Acquisition:
Fear acquisition has also been explained in terms of evolutionary models. Much of
the basis for this approach has developed from the finding of the non-random
distribution of fears. It is thought that fear and anxiety play a survival role
(Merckelbach & de Jong, 1997) and that fearfulness is partially under genetic control
(Stevenson, Batten & Cherner, 1992). Three evolutionary approaches are described
by Merckelback and de Jong (1997). The first focuses on one fear, blood-injection-
injury phobia (BII). It is argued that the vasovagal syncope observed in this type of
phobia is related to tonic immobility, death feigning and freezing seen in animal
adaptive behaviours (Marks & Nesse, 1994). Secondly it is believed that the purpose
of the vasovagal syncope is to slow down the circulation which is adaptive if the
organism is loosing blood (Barlow, 1988). However in a study carried out by De
Jongh et al (1998) no association between fainting and BII phobia was found.
The second evolutionary approach is based on a non-associative account of fear
acquisition. Menzies & Clark (1995) argue that no direct or indirect traumatic pairing
with the feared stimulus is required to explain phobic onset. They suggest that
evolutionary pressures have endowed certain stimulus configurations "prepotent"
cues (e.g. fear of heights, odors, and novelty) with fear evoking functions. These
cues were viewed, as threatening to the species and innate fear reactions to them
would have increased survival.
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The third evolutionary approach evolved from the work of Seligman (1971). He
argued that the non-random distribution of fears could be accounted for by a
biological predisposition to acquire certain fears following associative learning
(conditioning). Seligman's "preparedness" theory combines both conditioning theory
and non-associative leaning. Seligman (1971) argued that conditioning accounts of
phobias should be considered from within an evolutionary framework. His based his
premise on the argument that evolutionary pressures had selected for an adaptive
predisposition to associate pre-technologically dangerous stimulus with aversive
consequences and this could account for the disparity that fears appeared to attach to
some objects and situations e.g. snakes more than others e.g. cars. Although he
recognised that fears could also attach to unprepared stimuli, he believed that the
learning process was different for prepared and unprepared stimuli. He proposed that
fears to prepared stimuli were rapidly acquired, were resistant to extinction and
resistant to the influence of cognitive factors such as instructions and information
(Seligman, 1971).
He argued that individuals who acquired such fears would be more likely to survive,
reproduce and pass on genetic information. Therefore there was an adaptive value in
the development of certain fears.
Menzies and Clark (1995) argue that this model could account for some of the
difficulties found with the original conditioning model. They argue that it could
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account for the quick development of phobias with nonreinforced exposure, it could
also account for the difficulties with fear extinction. Ohman, Fredrickson, Hugdahl
and Rimmo (1976) reported that electrodermal responses conditioned to evolutionary
fear-relevant stimuli (snakes, spiders) are more resistant to extinction than responses
conditioned to evolutionary-fear-neutral stimuli (houses, flowers and mushrooms).
McNally and Foa, (1986) have not obtained evidence to support these findings.
Davey (1992) also reported that little evidence exists for rapid acquisition of
prepared fears in laboratory studies using human subjects.
The evolutionary models, place their emphasis on genetic influences and fear
acquisition, however as already discussed prior expectation of the CS-UCS
contingency, which may arise from cultural influences may also be influential in the
acquisition of fear. Thus possibly weakening the biological premise of the
evolutionary models. Although evolutionary models of fear acquisition have not been
proposed to account for dental anxiety it is possible that non-associative influences
may be involved in the acquisition of the disorder.
1.7 Cognitive Models ofFearAcquisition andMaintenance:
The importance of the role of beliefs and expectations in the aetiology and
maintenance of anxiety disorders are well researched. The main premise of the
cognitive model is that dysfunction arises from an individual's interpretation of
events with behavioural responses arising from these interpretations seen as
important in the maintenance of emotional problems (Wells, 1998). Although other
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cognitive approaches have been developed (Ellis 1962), the model of anxiety
proposed by Beck (1976) will be considered here.
Beck's (1976) cognitive theory of emotional disorders suggest that anxiety is
accompanied by distortions in thinking specifically centred around harm and danger,
this bias in thinking also maintains the emotional response. It is this fixation on
danger and harm and an associated underestimation of ability to cope which activates
the underlying danger schemas (Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985). Anxiety schemas
contain assumptions and beliefs about danger to one's personal domain (Beck et al
1985). Negative automatic thoughts (NATs) are appraisals or interpretations of
events and according to Beck et al (1985) can occur outside of the focus of
immediate awareness but are amenable to consciousness. NATs can occur in both
imaginal and verbal form. The same authors suggest that in specific phobias
individuals associate a situation or object with danger and hold assumptions
concerning the negative events that could occur when exposed to the stimulus.
Dysfunctional assumptions and beliefs are believed to result from early experiences.
Rachman (1998) observed that cognitive models of anxiety accept that the
acquisition of fears may be as a result of maladaptive learning, including
conditioning. However the emphasis is on the individuals interpretation of the event
whether the fear was acquired by conditioning or not.
2 Beck evoked the concept of schemas.These represent the sum of previous experiences, serving as
templates that direct attention, influence encoding, interpretation of stimuli and facilitate recall
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Merckelbach et al (1996) argue that specific phobia is not characterised by a general
cognitive dysfunction e.g. deficits in memory, motor deficits. They argue that
cognitive dysfunctions in specific phobias are restricted to certain processes i.e.
attentiona! and judgmental. Attentional biases have been demonstrated in specific
phobia using the modified Stroop task (subjects are required to name the colour of a
word while ignoring the meaning of the word). Lavy, van den Hout and Arntz (1993)
found that spider phobics recorded longer colour naming latencies when they were
presented with spider related words compared to non-spider related words.
Merckelbach et al (1996) explain this finding in terms of the spider phobic subjects
automatically directing their attention to the content of the threatening words, which
interferes with their main task. The same authors suggest that attentional bias has
clinical consequences. MacLeod and Hagan (1992) found that an attentional bias
towards threat-related material was a good predictor of emotional distress elicited by
stressful life events.
Merckelbach et al (1996) argue that two types of judgmental bias operate in the
maintenance of specific phobias. The first is covariation bias, which is the tendency
to overestimate the association between phobic stimuli and aversive outcomes
(Merckelbach et al, 1996; Tomarken, Sutton & Minelka, 1995). This has been
demonstrated experimentally (de Jong, Merckelbach & Arntz, 1995). Under
experimental conditions phobic subjects overestimate the contingency between
phobic stimuli and aversive outcomes, as discussed in the Tomarken, Minelka and
Cook (1989) study. Residual covariation bias following treatment for spider phobics
has been found to predict higher spider fear at 2 year follow-up (de Jong et al, 1995;
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Merchelbach et al 1996). According to Merchelbach et al (1996) the tendency to
attribute aversive experiences to the phobic object will sustain phobic fear.
The second judgmental bias believed to occur in specific phobias is that of emotional
reasoning (Beck & Emery, 1985). Arntz, Rauner and van den Hout (1995) argue that
fearful subjects tend to infer danger from fear, i.e. anxiety symptoms imply the
presence of danger. According to Merchelbach et al (1996) emotional reasoning may
serve to legitimise the phobic fear and may maintain the phobia.
A study by Thorpe and Salkovskis (1995) also found evidence that conscious
cognitions were present and central in a wide range of specific phobics and were
important in the maintenance of the disorder.
1.8 NeurobiolosicalModel ofFear Acquisition:
Studies carried out by Kluver and Bucy (1937) gave the first insight into the
neurobiological substrates of fear acquisition. Following temporal lobe resections in
monkeys, it was observed that their behaviour was characterised by visual agnosia,
hypersexuality, reduced neophobia and loss of fear. Later work indicated that the
reduced fear in resected monkeys was due specifically to damage in the amygdala
(Maren & Fanselow, 1996). The amygdala is thought responsible for initiating a
variety of hard-wired responses to threat (Brewin, 2001). These include the release of
stress hormones, activation of the sympathetic nervous system, and the behavioural
responses such as fight/flight and freezing (Armony & LeDoux, 1997). It is believed
that the amygdala integrates internal representations of the world in the form of
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memory images with emotional experiences associated with those memories
(Armony & LeDoux, 1997). Following assigning meaning to sensory information,
the amygdala guides emotional behaviour by projections to the hypothalamus,
hippocampus and basal forebrain (le Doux, 1995; van der Kolk, 1994).
LeDoux (1995) suggests that within the amygdala there are two systems, which have
specific roles with regard to fear acquisition. The basolateral complex (BLA) of the
amygdala is thought to be a substrate for sensory convergence from both cortical and
subcortical areas and is a locus for CS-UCS association during fear conditioning. In
contrast the central nucleus of the amygdala which receives projections from the
BLA projects to brain areas involved in the generation of fear responses, such as the
lateral hypothalamus (Maren & Fanselow, (1996). Destruction of neurones in the
BLA or central amygdala has been found to be detrimental to both the acquisition
and expression of conditioned fear (LeDoux 1995). The thalamus-amygdala pathway
(the thalamus carries out a quick analysis of the sensory input which then activates
the amygdala which generates an emotional response). According to LeDoux (1995)
this is a "quick and dirty" route, which in certain situations allows rapid responses to
threatening stimuli, which it may be argued, have an adaptive value.
Urbach-Wiethe disease is a rare disorder that results in bilateral degeneration of the
amygdala. Bechara et al (1995) studied a patient with this disorder and found that
compared with normal control patients there was no evidence of a fear response
following either a visual or auditory CS-UCS pairing (loud noise). Although this
patient displayed a fear conditioning deficit, she was found to be able to accurately
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recall the training procedures. A study carried out with a patient with combined
amygdala and hippocampal damage found that both fear conditioning and recall of
the procedure was disrupted (Maren & Fanselow, 1996).
The hippocampal system is thought to record in memory the spatial and temporal
dimensions of experience, playing an important role in the categorisation and storage
of incoming stimuli in memory (van der Kolk, 1997). According to van der Kolk
(1994) proper functioning of the hippocampal system is necessary for declarative
memoiy.
Maren and Fanslow (1996) suggest that the amygdaloid system plays a critical role in
fear conditioning and the hippocampal system mediates declarative memory for the
events associated with training. Further evidence that suggests the amygdala
participates in fear acquisition is the finding of high densities of binding sites to
substances that modulate fear and aggression such as the benzodiazepines (Niehoff&
Kuhar, 1983) and serotonin (Hensman, Guimaraes, Wang & Deakin, 1991).
Most processing of sensory input according to van der Kolk (1994) occurs outside of
conscious awareness. Therefore it appears that these brain structures are significantly
involved in fear acquisition and response at the associative level.
There does appear to be evidence that both the amygdala and hippocampus are
involved in conditioned fear and memory. It is possible that other anatomical areas
are also involved in the mediation of fear and fear memories. A better understanding
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of brain systems that are involved in fear mediation may lead to more effective
pharmacological strategies for treating clinical fears. Drawing on both biological
and psychological knowledge may allow a better understanding of the processes
involved in fear acquisition, maintenance and treatment.
1.9 Dental Anxiety: Acquisition andMaintenance
Lautch (1971) who conducted one of the earliest studies into dental anxiety
suggested that dental fears are the result of learned associations between traumatic
experiences, dental care and the role of classical conditioning. He studied 34 dental
phobic patients and 34 control subjects. He reported that all the 34 dental phobics
had experienced a previous traumatic dental experience, mostly physical pain
however some patients reported a feeling of oncoming disaster. Ten of the non-
phobic subjects also reported a previous comparable traumatic dental experience. He
also found that the majority of phobic patients in his study developed dental phobia
in childhood and adolescence. All the dental phobic patients could recall the
traumatic experience vividly and according to the author any reference to dentistry
either in thought or reality produced vivid images of the traumatic experience and
heightened anxiety.
An example of a dental fear conditioning response is presented in figure 1.
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A number of other earlier studies have also investigated the origin of dental phobia.
Kleinknecht, Klepac and Alexander (1973) studied 487 students and found that 17
per cent reported negative expectancies from others as the perceived origin of their
dental fears, 13.5 per cent had experienced painful dental work and 17 per cent
reported poor dental management, physical abuse by the dentist and perceived
mistakes as the origin of their fears. Berstein, Kleinknecht and Alexander (1979)
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investigated 225 students, amongst the students who reported a fear of the dentist, 22
per cent attributed their fear to a single traumatic incident occurring in the dental
chair, 19 per cent reported vicarious factors and 50 per cent reported negative dentist
behaviours.
Ost and Hugdahl (1985) as reported earlier carried out an investigation into the origin
of dental and blood phobias amongst a clinical population. Their findings of
classification of the acquisition of phobias are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Acquisition of phobias of dental and blood phobics
WAY OF ACQUISITION DENTAL BLOOD
Direct conditioning n 35 (68.6%) n 10 (45.5%)
Vicarious experiences n 6 (11.8%) n 7 (31.8%)
Instruction/Information n 3 (5.9%) n 2 (9.1%)
Do^oll „ n ( I 1 "70/. \ r\ i £o/_\l > V' IWVUlt 11 / / /KJJ 11-/ ^i«/.v//uy
The same authors also investigated Rachman's (1978) hypothesis that different
pathways of fear would show differences in anxiety components. No significant
differences were found between dental phobics (direct and indirect conditioning) on
the measures of physiological reactions (heart-rate), negative thoughts (regarding the
worst phobic situation) or anticipatory worry. Phobias acquired through indirect
pathways were found to have higher, but non-significant scores on a specific dental
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fear questionnaire (Dental Anxiety Scale) than those phobias acquired via direct
conditioning pathways. This is contrary to Rachman's prediction.
Ost and Hugdahl (1985) also found that 25 per cent of the dental phobics
experienced mild-to-moderate forms of generalised anxiety that was not associated
with their phobic situation. This was compared to 9 per cent of the blood phobics.
Kent (1998) suggests that in general, a classical conditioning model is probably the
most helpful in understanding the onset of dental anxiety and dental phobia.
However he does suggest difficulties with the classical conditioning processes
related to dental fears. One difficulty is that many individuals who are not highly
dentally anxious or dental phobic have also experienced a situation where classical
conditioning occurred (as found in Lautch's original study). Vassend (1993) found
that 30 per cent of a sample of non-phobics had experienced intense pain at some
point in their dental histories. Davey (1989) found that a group of individuals who
reported a traumatic painful dental experience but did not develop dental anxiety had
a history of trauma free dental treatments prior to the traumatic episode. This finding
was accounted for by latent inhibition.
A number of recent studies provide evidence for the role of direct conditioning
experiences in the acquisition of dental fear. De Jongh, et al (1995a), and Locker,
Liddell, Dempster and Shapiro (1999) report that the majority of patients with
clinically significant dental fears identify the onset of their fears to one or more
traumatic dental event (painful treatment or treatment associated with terror).
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De Jongh et al (1995a) found that amongst a group of undergraduate students the
extent to which earlier dental treatments were perceived as painful, the extent to
which earlier dental treatments were perceived as traumatic, and the frequency of
painful dental experiences were all related to levels of dental anxiety. The authors
also found that the dentally anxious students exhibit a high occurrence of negative
thoughts. They were found to exhibit more catastrophizing thoughts, experience
more difficulties in suppressing their negative thoughts and experience greater
difficulty implementing relaxation and distraction techniques during dental
procedures. This finding that negative cognitions play an important part in the
presentation of dental anxiety supports the work by Thorpe and Salkovskis (1995)
who observed that conscious cognitions are central in phobic disorders.
De Jongh, Muris, ter Zuuren, Schoemakers & Makkes (1995b) further assessed the
influence of cognitive factors, which may maintain or exacerbate dental anxiety. The
authors constructed The Dental Cognitions Questionnaire (DCQ) to assess the
frequency and believability of beliefs pertaining to dental treatment. De Jongh et al
(1995b) found that dental phobic patients reported a higher frequency of negative
and catastrophic thoughts than a group of non-phobic control participants. The
authors found that the thought content of dental phobic patients revealed that many
beliefs related to suffocation and loss of control, which De Jongh et al (1995a)
suggest resembles the contents of thoughts held by patients with panic disorder and
other types of phobias. Thus adding further evidence that dental phobic patients may
have characteristics of other anxiety disorders.
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The dental phobic patients also reported a greater degree of belief in their negative
thoughts. It was reported in this study that specific negative cognitions (loss of
control, negative consequences of treatment, the dentist and condition of teeth)
explained more than 70 per cent of the variance of dental phobics state anxiety
ratings in the dental situation.
De Jongh, Muris, Schoenmakers & Ter Horst (1995c) argue that if treatment for
dental phobia is to be effective, treatment should address the central beliefs and
negative self-statements held by the patient irrespective of the level of dental anxiety.
De Jongh et al (1995c) argue that the negative beliefs dental phobics hold about
themselves and dental treatment are important determinants of their psychological
distress. The authors carried out a study looking at one-session cognitive treatment of
dental phobia. They found that compared to a group given an information
intervention and a waiting list control group, a cognitive restructuring group
displayed a decrease in frequency and believability of negative cognitions and a
reduction in dental anxiety. However at follow-up (one-year post treatment) no
differences were found between the information and cognitive restructuring group
for dental anxiety. However it is possible that implementing just one session may not
eliminate strongly held beliefs amongst patients who have been dentally anxious for
some time. Beck et al (1985) do not recommend one session of cognitive therapy for
patients with moderate or severe anxiety, with the recommendation of twenty
sessions over a number of months. Further research is obviously required to address
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both the identification of beliefs amongst dental anxious patients and cognitive
interventions.
Indirect conditioning has also been investigated in the aetiology of dental phobia.
Studies have examined the influence of these factors and have found that parental
reactions especially maternal are an important aetiological factor (Horst & Wit,
1993; Milgrom, Mancle, King & Weinstein, 1995). As discussed earlier, Locker et al
(1999) found that a family history of dental anxiety was important and was predictive
with respect to child-onset anxiety. Milgrom et al (1995) also found that direct
conditioning and modeling were both important predictors of dental anxiety
originating in childhood.
Townend, Dimigen and Fung (2000) also found similar influences, they reported a
strong association with the conditioning pathway of dental fear acquisition, followed
by the modelling pathway amongst a group of children with dental anxiety. They
also found that children's fear was more strongly associated with subjective
experience of pain and trauma than with objective dental pathology.
It is clear from the literature that where individuals are able to recollect the incidents
that they believe contribute to their dental fears most recall experiences associated
with pain or terror (De Jongh et al 1995a; Moore et al, 1991).
De Jongh, Aartman and Brand (manuscript submitted for publication) investigated
the extent to which individuals with dental phobia presented with trauma-related
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symptomatology. Two groups were investigated, a group of patients with dental
phobia and a group of non-dentally anxious controls. They found that the proportion
of patients who reported a distressing dental procedure did not differ between the two
groups. However significantly more patients in the phobic group reported intrusive
memories of their distressing dental events. This study will be further discussed in
chapter five and study two in relation to trauma-related symptoms in, patients with
dental anxiety.
Study one will investigate pathway of conditioning and levels of dental anxiety,
physiological arousal and behavioural avoidance related to dental care amongst a
group of patients with dental anxiety.
Aims Of Study 1
Study 1 tested Rachman's (1968) hypothesis that direct conditioning experiences will
lead to higher levels of fear than indirect conditioning experiences. This was
investigated in a group of patients with dental anxiety.
Hypotheses
1) Direct dental conditioning experiences will lead to higher levels of dental anxiety
as measured by the Modified Dental Anxiety Scale than dental anxiety acquired
via indirect conditioning experiences.
2) Direct dental conditioning experiences will lead to higher physiological arousal
associated with dental situations and procedures as measured by the Dental Fear
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Survey (physiological arousal scale) than dental anxiety acquired via indirect
conditioning experiences
3) Direct dental conditioning experiences will lead to higher levels of behavioural
avoidance associated with dental situations and procedures as measured by the
Dental Fear Survey (behavioural avoidance scale) than dental anxiety acquired
via indirect conditioning experiences
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Chapter 2: Study 1: Comparison of Dental Anxiety Measures and Direct and
Indirect Pathways ofFear Acquisition.
Methods
2.1 Design: A between subjects design was used to investigate the differences
between the two conditioning groups (direct and indirect) on the measures of dental
anxiety, physiological arousal and behavioural avoidance related to dental situations
and procedures.
2.2 Sample: The sample consisted of adult patients who attended the Dundee Dental
Hospital Anxiety Clinic during University ofDundee terms October 1998-May 2000.
The Dundee Dental anxiety clinic (University of Dundee and Tayside Teaching
Hospital Trust) was set-up in 1998. It was developed for the clinical teaching of
anxiety management for final year, undergraduate dental students. The clinic only
accepts patients who are suitable for student care. A clinical psychologist, two dental
surgeons and a dental assistant staff the dental anxiety clinic. The clinic runs from
October to May to coincide with the university teaching terms.
Patients were referred to the anxiety clinic from both dental hospital staff (dental
surgeons) and community, dental surgeons. The clinical assessment and data
collection for study one was carried out by the clinical psychologist, dental surgeons
and undergraduate dental students working in the dental anxiety clinic. The author
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carried out no data collection for this study. The clinical psychologist, the dental
surgeons or the undergraduate dental students, perform the general clinical
assessment (see below). The dental staff perform the dental examination.
2.3 Measures:
The Modified Dental Anxiety Scale (MDAS) (Appendix 1) (Humphris, Morrison &
Lindsay, 1995): The MDAS is a modified version of the Corah's Dental Anxiety
Scale (CDAS) (1969) which has been widely used for measuring dental trait anxiety
(De Jongh, et al 1995c). Although the CDAS has been widely used and information
about reliability and validity is widely available, it was believed that patients could
be confused by some of the questions (Humphris et al, 1995). The CDAS was found
to confound answers reflecting emotions with answers describing physical
experience. It was also considered that in addition a further item was essential
specifically relating to local anaesthesia. Fear of a needle injection was ranked as
high as the drill in terms of dental fear (Stouthard & Hoogstaaten, 1987).
The MDAS consists of 5 questions with scores added to give a general dental anxiety
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score. A cut-off score of 19 and above indicates the respondent as being dentally
anxious. The cut-off point has been determined by a reliably defined group of dental
phobics with sensitivity and specificity estimates presented (Humphris et al, 1995).
The CDAS cut-off point was determined by clinical judgement without supporting
data to allow assessment of the suitability of the cut-off (Corah, Gale & Illig, 1978).
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The MDAS has been shown to demonstrate high levels of reliability as calculated by
the use of Cronbach's alpha formula, a's above 0.7. The sensitivity and specificity of
the measure adopting the cut-off point of 19 were 0.85 and 0.91 respectively. Further
research has been carried out to gain further evidence of the psychometric properties
of the MDAS. In a multi-national study the overall reliability was 0.89 (Humphris,
Freeman, Campbell, Tuutti & D'Souza, 2000).
Dental Fear Survey (DFS) (Kleinknecht, Klepac and Alexander, 1973). Participants
are asked to rate their anxieties about twenty-seven situations related to dental fear.
The first area assesses patient's avoidance of dentistry because of fear; the second
area assesses degree of physiological arousal; the third area measures the degree of
fear associated with dental situations and procedures; the final area provides an
overall rating of the patient's fear related to dental treatment. The questionnaire is
scored by adding the scores for each of the 4 areas separately plus a total score for
the measure. The maximum avoidance score is 10, physiological arousal 25,
procedures score, 60 overall fear, 5 and total score, 100. There is no specific cut-off
but higher scores indicate more dental fear. According to Schuurs and Hoogstraten
(1993) the DFS is primarily designed to detect the fear induced by the separate
categories. The same authors report that the DFS has been shown to lack validity.
However in one study comparing the CDAS and the DFS, phobic behaviour was
found to be better identified by the DFS (Johansson & Berggren, 1992). Schuurs and
Hoogstraten (1993) report test-retest reliability coefficients of 0.74 for items across
participants and 0.73 for participants across all items. Schuurs & Hoogstraten, 1993
also report a split-half reliability Cronbachs's a= 0.93 and r=0.96.
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2.4 Clinical Interview: Clinical assessments are carried out for each patient who
attends the dental anxiety clinic. This includes demographic details and dental and
psychological history. Patients are asked whether they have experienced a bad dental
experience, those who answer yes, are recorded as having a direct conditioning
experience. Patients who answer no to this question are categorised as having an
indirect experience.
The outcome of the assessment is discussed with the patient and a treatment plan is
developed which includes dental, pharmacological and behavioural interventions.
Some patients opt for pharmacological treatment alone, these patients are then
transferred to a sedation only waiting list. Dental treatments and behavioural
management of anxiety are carried out by final year, undergraduate dental students,
under supervision from the clinical psychologist and dental surgeons.
2.5 Analyses: Analysis was carried out using the Statistical Package for Social
Sciences/Windows (SPSS 10). Exploratory data analysis was used to determine the
level of normality relating to distribution of the measured variables. An
independent-samples t-test was used to identify differences between group 1 (direct
conditioning) and group 2 (indirect conditioning) on measures of dental anxiety
(MDAS) and physiological and behavioural avoidance (DFS).
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Chapter 3: Results: Study 1 Comparison of Dental Anxiety Measures and Direct
and Indirect Pathways ofFearAcquisition
The data set was checked for errors prior to analysis. No out-of-range values were
found for any of the variables. Missing data were noted and the patients notes were
checked accordingly. Exploratory data analysis was performed to provide
information concerning the distribution of scores on continuous variables and to




Data were analysed from sixty-one patients, nine males and fifty-two females.
Patients were separated into two groups based on their inclusion in either the direct
or indirect conditioning group. Forty-five patients were recorded as having a direct
conditioning experience. Sixteen patients were identified as having an indirect
conditioning experience.
3,1.2 Exploratory Data Analysis of the MDAS, DFS Behavioural Avoidance and
Physiological Arousal Scales
Histograms were used to display the distribution of scores for the above measures for
the direct and indirect conditioning groups (see appendix 2; MDAS, appendix 3:
DFS physiological scores, appendix 4: DFS behavioural avoidance scores).
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Altman and Bland (1995) suggest that relying on visual inspection of the distribution
of scores to determine the assumption of normality is unreliable. The authors argue
that formal statistical analysis should be performed to assess whether the sample data
conforms to a normal distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic was performed
to formally assess the assumption of normality. The results of this test are presented
in table 2.
Table 2. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Normality, Study 1
Measure condir df Sig
MDAS direct 45 .076
indirect 16 .200
DFSPHYS direct 45 .200
indirect 16 .200
DFSAVOID Direct 45 .083
Indirect 16 .154
*MDASTOT scores for Modified Dental Anxiety Scale
*DFSPHYS scores for DFS physiological arousal scale
* DFSAVOID scores for DFS avoidance subscale
A non-significant result (sig. value of more than 0.05) indicates normality. The
results obtained from this population suggest that the assumption of normality has
not been violated. As the assumption of normality has not been violated, parametric
tests were applied for the analysis.
Table 3 presents the mean age for the direct and indirect conditioning group. An
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the ages for the direct and
indirect conditioning groups.
Table 3. Mean age for the Direct and Indirect Conditioning Groups and Independent-
samples t-test for age, Direct and Indirect conditioning groups, Study 1
Group N Mean (SD) df t Sig (2-tailed) 95% CI
lower upper
Direct 45 34.82(12.47) 59 .405 .687 -5.70 8.59
Indirect 16 33.38(11.64)
There was no statistically significant differences found for age between the direct




Hypotheses one predicted that direct dental conditioning experiences will lead to
higher levels of dental anxiety than dental anxiety acquired via indirect conditioning
experiences. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare dental anxiety
scores (MDAS) between the direct and indirect conditioning groups. Table 4 presents
the mean scores for dental anxiety for the direct and indirect groups and
Independent-samples t-test between the conditioning groups.
Table 4. Mean Scores for Dental Anxiety Levels, Study One and Independent-
samples t-test MDAS between Direct and Indirect conditioning groups, Study 1
Group N Mean (SD) df t Sig (1-tailed) 95% CI
lower upper
Direct 45 21.47 (2.30) 59 .242 .404 -1.46 1.15
Indirect 16 21.63 (2.06)
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There was no statistically significant difference found for dental anxiety between the
direct and indirect conditioning groups. The direct conditioning group were not
found to have higher levels of dental anxiety compared to the indirect group, (t (59)
=.242; p=0.404, one-tailed).
Hypotheses 2
Hypotheses two predicted that direct conditioning experiences will lead to higher
levels of physiological arousal associated with dental situations and procedures than
dental anxiety acquired via indirect conditioning experiences. An independent-
samples t-test was conducted to compare DFS physiological scores between the two
conditioning groups.
Table 5. Mean DFS scores for physiological arousal: Direct and Indirect
conditioning groups and Independent-samples t-test for DFS physiological arousal,
Direct and Indirect conditioning groups, Study 1.
Group N Mean (SD) df t Sig (1-tailed) 95% CI
lower upper
Direct 45 19.91 (3.90) 59 1.25 .115 -1.34 5.42
Indirect 16 17.88 (6.04)
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There was no statistically significant difference found for physiological arousal
between the direct and indirect conditioning groups. The direct conditioning group
were not found to have higher levels of physiological arousal compared to the
indirect group, (t (59)=1.25; p= 0.115, one-tailed).
Hypotheses 3
Hypotheses three predicted that direct conditioning experiences will lead to higher
levels of behavioural avoidance associated with dental situations and procedures than
dental anxiety acquired via indirect conditioning experiences. An independent-
samples t-test was conducted to compare DFS behavioural avoidance scores between
the two conditioning groups.
Table 6. Mean DFS scores for behavioural avoidance, Direct and Indirect
conditioning groups and Independent-samples t-test for DFS behavioural avoidance,
Direct and Indirect conditioning groups, Study 1.
Group N Mean (SD) df t Sig (1-tailed) 95% CI
lower upper
Direct 45 7.09(1.69) 59 1.06 .151 -.76 2.31
Indirect 16 6.31 (2.75)
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There was no statistically significant difference found for behavioural avoidance
between the direct and indirect conditioning groups. The direct conditioning group
were not found to have higher levels of behavioural avoidance than the indirect
group (t= (59)= 1.06; p=0.151, one-tailed).
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Chapter 4: Discussion Study 1: Comparison of Dental Anxiety Measures and
Direct and Indirect Pathways ofFear Acquisition.
Study one was conducted to test Rachman's (1968) hypothesis that direct
conditioning experiences will lead to higher levels of fear than indirect conditioning
experiences. This was investigated in a group of patients with dental anxiety.
It was predicted that direct dental conditioning experiences would lead to higher
levels of dental anxiety than dental anxiety acquired via indirect experiences.
However this was not supported. Dental anxiety identified as being acquired via the
direct pathway did not lead to higher levels of dental anxiety.
It was also predicted that direct dental conditioning experiences would lead to higher
levels of physiological arousal associated with dental situations and procedures than
dental anxiety acquired via the indirect pathway. Although the mean DFS
physiological subscale was found to be numerically higher in the direct conditioning
group, statistical analyses did not find any differences between the two groups. The
hypothesis was not supported. Dental anxiety identified as being acquired via the
direct pathway did not lead to higher levels of physiological arousal associated with
dental stimuli and procedures.
The third hypothesis predicted that direct dental conditioning experiences would lead
to higher levels of behavioural avoidance associated with dental situations and
procedures than dental anxiety acquired via the indirect pathway. Although the mean
DFS behavioural avoidance subscale was found to be numerically higher in the direct
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conditioning group, statistical analysis did not find any difference between the two
groups. The hypothesis was not supported. Dental anxiety identified as being
acquired via the direct pathway did not lead to higher levels of behavioural
avoidance associated with dental stimuli and procedures.
No differences were observed in the strength of the responses between the two
groups in this study. A number of factors may account for the failure to support the
hypotheses. Rachman (1968) proposed that direct conditioning would lead to a
greater strength of response than that observed in fears acquired via the indirect
pathway. He also argued that fears acquired via the indirect pathway would lead to
elevated cognitive correlates (higher levels of negative cognitions). It is possible that
the indirect group in this study presented with elevated scores on the three measures
due to cognitive rehearsal and revaluation of the UCS, thus leading to inflation of the
UCS prior to the encounter with the CS. Unfortunately, there were no measures of
cognitive beliefs for the two groups available for this study. Rather than thereby
making it difficult to conclude with any certainty that this may have contributed
towards the failure to support the hypotheses. However as Davey (1992) suggests
more work is required on the nature and content of the UCS representations
generated by direct and indirect conditioning.
Another explanation that may account for the failure to support the hypotheses is that
some patients identifying direct dental experiences to account for their fears may
have attributed negative events to external causes. Withers and Deane (1995) argue
that the identification of the direct pathway to explain the onset of fear may be more
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compatible with lay explanation of the causes of fears. Retrospective accounts of
acquisition of fear are also believed to be subject to memory or information bias.
Therefore it is possible that some of the individuals identifying a direct conditioning
experience may have acquired their fears due to an indirect experience, thereby
biasing the data used for the analysis.
As found in previous research (Ost and Hugdahl, 1985) the number of direct
conditioned cases was higher than those who were identified as acquiring their dental
anxiety via the indirect pathway. However a limitation with the data used in study
one was the classification of indirect experiences. Patients not identifying a direct
conditioning experience were automatically assumed to have had an indirect dental
experience, which would account for their dental anxiety. This line of reasoning is
not supported by arguments put forward for example by Davey (1992) who argued
that sensory preconditioning could explain why some individuals are unable to recall
any direct trauma at the time of their first appearance of their fear. Also according to
the non-associative account of fear acquisition, no direct or indirect traumatic pairing
with the feared stimulus is required to explain phobic onset (Menzies & Clark, 1995).
In addition Rachman (1968) proposed two indirect pathways of fear conditioning,
vicarious and transmission of information. Vicarious experiences have been reported
as being the second most common pathway to fear acquisition. There is no
identification amongst the indirect group from study one's population as to the
indirect pathway.
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However the data used in study one were collected for clinical purposes and
therefore research protocols were not applied. A number of extraneous variables
were associated with the collection of this data e.g. different individuals collected the
data and there was no control over the order of the administration of the
questionnaires.
These factors do limit any meaningful conclusions based on the evaluation of the
data included in study one.
Another limitation in this study was the small sample size. However normality of the
distribution of the scores was met for this sample and Motulsky (1995) argues that in
small samples that are normally distributed nonparametric tests lack statistical power.
Therefore the use of parametric tests appears justified.
Menzies and Clark (1995) have suggested that clinicians should avoid insisting that
associative learning events have occurred in the patient's past and are the crucial
determinants of the patient's present fear. According to the authors all models of fear
acquisition should be examined by the clinician. Insisting that patients have forgotten
conditioning events is not according to Menzies and Clark (1995) profitable during
therapy. In addition to this argument, it can be argued that examining levels of
anxiety related to pathways of conditioning may not contribute to the treatment
process. Rachman (1977) did originally propose that direct conditioning would
predominate in clinical cases, whereas indirect acquisition would account for mild
fears. This hypothesis has not been borne out by the findings of this study where no
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differences were found regardless of fear acquisition pathway between the two
groups. Withers and Deane (1995) have suggested that indirect pathways of fear
acquisition should also be included when investigating other psychological disorders
such as from the disaster/trauma perspective.
De Jongh et al (manuscript submitted for publication) reported that intrusive
memories of past traumatic dental events are associated with trauma-related
symptoms. However only direct distressing experiences were addressed. Chapter five
and study two will further examine the association of intrusive memories related to
past distressing dental experiences and trauma-related symptoms, and will
investigate if differences exist between participants with intrusive memories and
those without intrusive memories on levels of general psychopathology and beliefs
related to dental care. This study will include participants who report indirect
pathways of fear acquisition i.e. vicarious conditioning and transmission of
information.
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Chapter 5. History and Models of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and
Applications to Medical and Dental Fears.
5.1 Introduction and History of PTSD
Psychological problems arising from extreme trauma can be found in the literature
since the time of Homer (Alford, 1992). Van der Kolk, Weisaeth and van der Hart
(1996a) observe that an association between symptoms of hysteria and childhood
histories of trauma can be traced back to 1859 and the work of Briquet. Yule,
Williams and Joseph (1999) describe reactions to acute stress appearing in
Shakespearean plays. The same authors describe the concept of "railway spine". This
followed the introduction of mass transport in Victorian times and was described as
psychological reactions to railway disasters that seemed out of scale with the actual
accident. These psychological reactions were explained as the effects of direct
damage to the spine and central nervous system (CNS) (Yule et al, 1999).
Traumatic neurosis was first used by Oppenheim in 1889 and he argued that
functional problems were produced by subtle changes in the molecular system in the
CNS (van der Kolk et al 1996a). Traumatic neurosis was commonly found in combat
soldiers and was frequently associated with cardiovascular symptoms which led to
other terms being used to describe their difficulties such as "irritable heart" and
"soldiers heart" (van der Kolk et al, 1996a).
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During World War 1 traumatic stress reactions became known as "shell shock". Van
der Kolk et al (1996) note that as "shell shock" could be found in soldiers never
directly exposed to gunfire, it started to become clear the causes could be related to
emotional influences as well as direct traumatic experiences.
During the second World War the concept of post-trauma syndrome (Kardiner, 1941)
began to be recognised. Post-trauma syndrome was recognised by irritability,
outbursts of aggression, exaggerated startle response and fixations on the traumatic
event (Yule et al, 1999). Kardiner (1941) also noted that patients presenting with
post-trauma syndrome developed altered conceptions of the self in relation to the
world, due to being fixated on the trauma.
Van der Kolk et al (1996) describe the account of Janet's (1889) explanation of the
psychological processing of trauma. Janet proposed that when people experience
intense emotions their minds become incapable of matching their frightening
experiences with existing cognitive schemes. As a result, their memories of the
experience cannot be integrated into personal awareness, instead the memories are
dissociated from consciousness and voluntary control. Janet's (1889) formulation of
the effects of trauma on the mind was based on the notion that extreme emotional
arousal results in failure to integrate traumatic memories. Breuer and Freud (1893)
also commented on the nature of dissociation and introduced the concept of defense
hysteria (Nemiah, 1997). Breuer and Freud proposed that the ego actively repressed
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memories of the traumatic event to protect itself from experiencing the painful
affects associated with them (Nemiah, 1997). The psychoanalytical model of PTSD
will be further discussed in section 5.4.
Van der Kolk and van der Hart (1989) reappraised the work of Janet. They proposed
that Janet was the first to study dissociation systematically as the crucial
psychological process with which the organism reacts to overwhelming experiences
and show that traumatic memories may be expressed as sensory perceptions, affect
states, and behavioural re-enactments. Janet believed that frightening or novel
experiences could be split off from conscious awareness and voluntary control, and
that fragments of unintegrated events may show up later as pathological automatisms
(Janet believed that only a small part of the interaction between an organism and its
environment occurs within conscious awareness, most experiences, values, habits
and innate and acquired skills are automatically integrated into existing cognitive
schema without conscious awareness, he called these automatic adaptations
"automatisms") Van der Kolk and van der Hart (1989).
It is believed that dissociation plays a role in the development of trauma-related
psychological problems (Briere & Conti, 1993; Van der Kolk, van der Hart &
Marmar 1996b; Shalev, Peri, Caneti & Schreiber, 1996). Dissociation is described by
Van der Kolk et al (1996b) as a compartmentalization of experience, where elements
of a trauma are not integrated into a unitary whole or an integrated sense of self. Van
der Hart, van der Kolk and Boon (1996) utilise dissociation to refer to three distinct
but related phenomena.
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Primary dissociation occurs when individuals are confronted with overwhelming
threat. It is suggested that sensory and emotional elements of the experience are not
integrated onto personal memory and identity, thus the experience is split into
isolated somatosensory elements, without integration into a personal narrative (van
der Hart et al 1996; Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995).
Secondary dissociation is believed to occur once an individual is in a dissociated
state. Fromm (1965) described a dissociation between observing ego and
experiencing ego. van der Hart et al (1996) describe this process as individuals
mentally leaving their body at the moment of trauma and observing what happens
from a distance, allowing individuals to observe the traumatic experience as
spectators, and to limit their pain and distress, van der Hart et al (1996) suggest that
whereas primary dissociation limits individuals cognitions regarding the reality of
the experience and allows them to go on temporarily as if nothing has happened,
secondary dissociation places individuals out of touch with feelings and emotions
related to the trauma. Marmar, Weiss, Schlenbger (1994) refer to secondary
dissociation as peritraumatic dissociation.
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Tertiary dissociation is described by van der Hart et al (1996) as a process where
individuals develop distinct ego states that contain the traumatic experience
consisting of complex identities with distinct cognitive, affective and behavioural
patterns. It is proposed that some ego states may contain the pain, fear or anger
related to traumatic experiences, while other ego states remain unaware of the trauma
and its concomitant affects.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was not recognised until after the Vietnam
War (Figley, 1978). In 1983 PTSD was included in the third edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (APA 1983,1987).
Following a traumatic episode, individuals show a variety of responses. Shalev
(1992) reported that symptoms of PTSD are frequently observed during the early
days following a trauma. These include, in particular intrusive memories, arousal and
dissociation. According to Rothbaum and Foa (1993) early symptoms subside with
time in many individuals following a traumatic experience.
The criteria for PTSD has been revised in both DSM-III-R and DSM-IV (APA 1987,
1994). PTSD criteria, has also been revised in the various revisions of the
International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of Death
(ICD). The current ICD-10 (1993) and DSM-IV criteria for PTSD although similar,
place different emphasis on emotional numbing, with ICD-10 not viewing it as
necessaiy for a diagnosis ofPTSD (Yule et al 1999).
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DSM-IV (APA, 1987,1994) characteristics for PTSD include; a) that a person has
been exposed to a traumatic event, either experiencing, witnessing or being
confronted with the event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury,
or threat to the person's or others physical integrity
b) the person's response to this involves fear, helplessness or horror,
c) the person re-experiences the traumatic event, which may be experienced as
intrusive thoughts, nightmares, flashbacks, and intense psychological distress when
exposed to reminders of the trauma
d) the person avoids stimuli associated with the trauma, avoidance can be
behavioural, cognitive or emotional, numbing symptoms may also be present, which
include detachment from others and restricted range of affect
e) symptoms of increased arousal including heightened startle reactions, outbursts of
anger and difficulty concentrating.
A diagnosis of PTSD requires 30 days of symptom duration. It is defined as acute if
duration of symptoms is less than 3 months and chronic if the duration of symptoms
is 3 months or more (DSM-IV). The disorder does not have to appear within a certain
time period after the trauma and can be specified as with delayed onset, if onset of
symptoms is at least 6 months after the stressor (DSM-IV).
McFarlane and de Girolamo (1996) argue that problems exist characterising the
nature of trauma. They suggest that central to the experience of traumatic stress are
the dimensions of helplessness, powerlessness and threat to one's life, however
trauma also attacks the individual's sense of self and predictability of the world.
McFarlane and de Girolamo (1996) argue that there has been little discussion of
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these dimensions of trauma. They criticise the development of the DSM-1V stressor
criteria for its attention to stressors from within specific populations who had
experienced a limited range of traumatic experiences (mainly violence). They also
argue that a further problem with the stressor criteria is its implication that a different
causal relationship exists between PTSD and environmental factors than between
other psychiatric disorders and such factors, suggesting that individual vulnerability-
plays a less important role in precipitating PTSD than in other psychiatric disorders.
However the prevalence of co-morbidity provides a challenge to this (see section
5.4).
McFarlane and de Girolamo (1996) argue that it is possible that PTSD symptoms can
develop even after a minor stressor. Jeavons, Greenwood and de L. Home (2000)
carried out a study using a sample of individuals who had been involved in minor
road traffic accidents. They reported that initial cognitions such as the individual's
perceived threat to life at the time of the accident other than the objective degree of
trauma had the strongest relationships to subsequent trauma. Breslau and Davis
(1992) found that direct exposure was not more likely to lead to chronic symptoms of
PTSD than were indirect experiences. These findings however do not run counter to
DSM-1V, which indicates the importance of appraisal of the traumatic event.
McFarlene and de Girolamo's (1996) argue that it is possible that psychiatric
disorders themselves can lead to secondary PTSD. They argue that as many as 50 per
cent of patients who have been acutely psychotic will develop a PTSD-type
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syndrome in response to their disorder. Thus arguing that inner types of experience
should also be considered along with external traumatic experiences.
Briere (1998) also makes a number of points regarding the difficulties associated
with the subsequent effects of the traumatic experience. He argues that the subjective
response required to allow a PTSD diagnosis (fear, horror or helplessness) is open to
potential difficulties. He argues that both victim and clinician may have difficulty
determining if the fear, horror or helplessness was sufficiently intense to qualify for
the diagnosis. Briere (1998) suggests that other negative responses to trauma may
also increase the risk of posttraumatic reactions. Shame, and degradation have been
identified by Wong and Cook (1992) as risk factors for traumatic reactions.
Secondly, he argues that there is insufficient research to determine whether a stressor
must evoke these specific responses, at a specific level of intensity. His third
argument is that subjective reports of distress are affected by emotional avoidance,
including dissociation. There is a potential therefore for some individuals as being
viewed as nontraumatised due to alternative responses of distress that do not meet the
DSM-1V criteria. Briere (1998) also proposes that the subjective responses classified
in DSM-IV may be further mediated by phenomena that occur after the event. He
includes the level of perceived support from others, financial or interpersonal
influences, or the results of professional intervention.
In summary the diagnostic criteria for PTSD is well documented. However recent
findings such as those by Jeavons et al (2000) have brought into question the nature
of the subjective intensity of the stressor required for the development of the
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disorder. The reporting that inner types of experience should also be considered as
potential traumatic experiences raises the need for clinicians to be aware of the
number of potential experiences that may be potential triggers of the disorder.
5.2 Epidemiology of PTSD
According to McFarlene and de Girolamo (1996) epidemiological studies have
examined the survivors of a range of different traumatic events, however
generalisations are difficult to make due to the use of different concepts, competing
diagnostic systems, assessment methodologies and selective and nonrepresentative
samples.
Helzer, Robbins and McEvoy (1987) carried out the first epidemiological study of
PTSD and found a lifetime PTSD rate of 1.3 per cent and 0.5 per cent for women and
men respectively. Breslau, Davis, Andreski and Peterson (1991) surveyed a group of
young adults. Amongst those who had been exposed to a traumatic event (39 per
cent), PTSD was found amongst 13.6 per cent This gave an overall lifetime
prevalence of 9.2 per cent. As part of the US Epidemiological Catchment Area study
Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes and Neison (1995) estimated a population point
prevalence rate of I per cent. Yule et al (1999) suggest that studies of more exposed
samples give ranges from 5-15 per cent for current levels of PTSD and 4 to 12 per
cent for lifetime diagnosis. Yehuda, Kahana, Schmeider, Southwick, Wilson and
Giller (1994) note the high prevalence of persistent and chronic PTSD amongst
68
concentration camp survivors and world war two prisoners of war many years after
the event.
In a study examining genetic and environmental contributions for PTSD, True et al
(1993) reported that a significant genetic influence exists on PTSD symptom
liability. They studied pairs of monozygotic and dizygotic combat veterans. After
adjusting for combat exposure they found that genetic factors accounted for 13-30
per cent of the variance in liability for symptoms in the reexperiencing cluster, 30-34
per cent for symptoms in the avoidance cluster, and 28-32 per cent for symptoms in
the arousal cluster. They also reported that no evidence could be found that shared
environments could account for the development ofPTSD symptoms.
McFarlane and de Girolamo (1996) argue that PTSD is a predictable consequence of
traumatic events. However Yehuda and McFarlane (1995) suggest that no trauma is
so severe that almost everyone exposed to the experience develops PTSD. The
normality of PTSD following a severe stressor has been questioned due to the low
rates of diagnosable PTSD among those who have experienced traumatic events, and
the high rates of co-morbidity with other psychological difficulties among those with
PTSD (Yehuda & Mc Farlane, 1995).
McMillen, North and Smith (2000) argue that both the low incidence of PTSD after
some traumatic event and the psychiatric comorbidity seen in those with PTSD may
reflect the stringency of PTSD symptom criteria C, the effortful avoidance and
numbing criteria. They argue that meeting criteria C is more difficult for at least two
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reasons. It requires a higher number of reported symptoms (3), and the symptoms in
this cluster are some of the least frequently reported symptoms. A number of studies
have found that the numbing symptoms have a low prevalence rate compared to
higher rates of criteria B (intrusive memories) and D, symptoms of hyper arousal
(North, Smith, & Spitznagel, 1994; Smith, North, McCool, Shea, 1990). McMillen et
al (2000) carried out a study amongst earthquake survivors. They found that only 13
per cent of their sample met full PTSD criteria, but 48 per cent met both the
reexperiencing and arousal symptom criteria, without meeting the avoidance and
numbing symptoms. They did find that psychiatric comorbidity (major depression,
alcohol and drug abuse) was associated mostly with avoidance and numbing
symptoms. For most of their sample, intrusive memories, sleep disturbance and
exaggerated startle response were the most common symptoms. Rothbaum and Foa
(1993) and Stein, Walker, Hazen and Forde (1997) have developed the term "partial
PTSD" to address the issue of individuals not meeting full PTSD diagnosis, but
however do present with significant trauma-related distress. However as yet there are
no criteria for this syndrome.
The above findings, suggest that meeting full PTSD diagnosis may be difficult due to
difficulties meeting criteria C, this may call into question the accuracy of the number
of individuals experiencing trauma-related symptoms and may well preclude
individuals from seeking or being given appropriate clinical treatment.
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5.3 Predisposing Factors:
Yehuda and McFarlane (1995) note that research indicates that a number of
predisposing or antecedent factors increase the likelihood that a given stressor
produces PTSD. They note that certain variables are associated with a likelihood of
posttraumatic disturbance.
Breslau et al (1997) found that the prevalence of PTSD was higher for women than
for men exposed to traumatic events. The risk for PTSD after exposure to traumatic
events was more than 2-fold higher in women than in men. They also found that
exposure to a number of traumatic events in a lifetime did not vary between the
sexes. Therefore they concluded that the risk of PTSD in women could not be
accounted for by a history of multiple traumatic events. However women were more
likely to report rape, assault or ongoing physical or sexual abuse than men. Exposure
to these categories of trauma yielded a high rate of early PTSD in women (63 per
cent) but no PTSD cases in men. Women's vulnerability to PTSD was found to be
greater if exposure to traumatic events occurred before the age of 15 years. Briere
(1998), Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes & Nelson (1995) suggest however that
the reason that women have higher levels of PTSD is that they are more likely than
men to be exposed to events that produce PTSD e.g. childhood abuse, rape and
physical assault. Davidson and Fairbank (1993) also argue that strong evidence exists
that a history of childhood trauma is a predisposing factor in the development of
PTSD.
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Brewin (2000) carried out a meta-analysis of risk factors for PTSD in which he
identified a number of factors i.e. childhood abuse, family psychiatric history, low
intelligence, lack of social support and life stress. However Shalev (2001) criticised
Brewin's findings suggesting that when effect sizes are considered a different pattern
emerges. Shalev (2001) argued that the intensity of the traumatic event and factors
that follow exposure (social support and further stressors) are the strongest predictors
of PTSD, this is similar to Briere's (1998) proposal. Shalev (2001) proposes that
there is ample opportunity for secondary prevention of PTSD when these post-
trauma factors are taken into account.
According to Bryant and Harvey (2000) identifying previous traumas and the
patient's response to earlier traumatic events is important, as previous trauma is a
known predisposing factor for the development of PTSD. Briere (1998) argues that
individuals who have experienced previous traumas are more prone to exacerbated
reactions to current traumas.
Terr (1991) draws a distinction between Type I and Type II traumatic events. Type I
are believed to be short term, unexplained traumatic events, whereas Type II are
believed to involve sustained and repeated events. Terr (1991) proposed that the
range of reactions differ between Type I and Type II traumas with Type II reactions
more likely to lead to more complex difficulties.
Marmar et al (1994) suggest that peritraumatic dissociation is a risk factor for PTSD.
A number of studies have offered support for this hypothesis. Holen (1993) found
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that levels of reported dissociation during a trauma was predictive of PTSD 6 months
after the accident. Koopman, Classen, and Spiegel (1994) observed that dissociative
symptoms at the time of the trauma more strongly predicted traumatic symptoms
than did anxiety at the time of the trauma.
Recently, Bryant and Harvey (1998) reported a study in which the diagnosis of Acute
Stress Disorder (ASD) was predictive of PTSD 6 months following the trauma (mild
traumatic brain injury following a road traffic accident). ASD was included in DSM-
IV to describe posttraumatic stress in the initial month after a trauma (Bryant &
Harvey, 1998). ASD follows the same structure of PTSD i.e. it is described in terms
of the stressor, reexperiencing, avoidance and arousal, however the symptom cluster
that differentiates ASD from PTSD is the emphasis on dissociative symptoms
(Bryant & Harvey, 2000). Either while experiencing the event or after experiencing
the event, the individual must have at least three of the following to meet criteria for
ASD: 1) a feeling of detachment, numbing or lack of emotional responsiveness; 2)
decreased awareness of surroundings; 3) derealization; 4) depersonalization; 5)
inability to remember a significant aspect of the trauma.
Other predisposing factors have also been identified that are believed to increase the
risk of developing PTSD. Breslau, Davis, Andreski & Peterson (1991) found three
personal characteristics to be significant risk-factors in both sexes. These were pre¬
existing anxiety disorders, major depressive disorders and early separation from
parents.
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Briere (1998) argues that traumatic event's combine with victim variables and post-
trauma social responses to determine the individuals subjective interpretation of the
stressor. Therefore making the determination of any specific aetiology involved in
PTSD difficult.
5.4 Comorbidity
Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes and Nelson (1995) reported that PTSD was
accompanied by a higher risk of mainly depression and other anxiety disorders.
Amongst disorders comorbid with PTSD they found a lifetime prevalence of 48 per
cent with major depressive disorder, 30 per cent with simple phobia, 28 per cent with
social phobia, there were no differences found between the sexes for these disorders.
They did find that females were more likely to present with panic disorder than
males (12.6 per cent versus 7.3 per cent), and agoraphobia (22.4 per cent versus 16.1
per cent). Males however were most likely to present with alcohol abuse (51 per cent
versus 27.9 per cent) and drug abuse (34.5 per cent versus 26.9 per cent).
Joseph, Yule, Williams and Hodgkinson (1993) also found reported increases in the
use of alcohol and cigarettes amongst survivors of a traumatic event.
There is also evidence that exposure to a traumatic event is a risk factor for medical
disorders, such as cardiovasular, gastrointestinal and musculosketal difficulties
(Friedman, 2000). Breslau and Davis (1992) found that individuals with chronic
PTSD (duration of symptoms for one year or longer) reported more medical
conditions than patients with acute PTSD (duration of symptoms less than one year).
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Bronchitis, migraine, and gynaecological complaints among women were more
commonly reported in the chronic PTSD group.
Somatization disorder has also been significantly associated with dissociation and
past child abuse (Pribor, Yutzy, Dean & Wetzel, 1993) and PTSD (McFarlane,
Atchinson, Rafalowicz & Papey, 1994).
As PTSD is believed to be associated with increased arousal and the inability to
regulate arousal (van der Kolk, 1994) it may be predicted that co-morbid difficulties
may also be present. Scaer (2001) argues that due to the activation of the autonomic
nervous system in individuals presenting with PTSD, cardiac, pulmonary and bowel
dysfunctions are predictable.
Shalev's (2001) proposal that lack of social support and further stressors following
an exposure to a traumatic event are the strongest predictors of PTSD may also
account for some of the other psychological disorders associated with it. Lack of
social support and stressful life events have also been identified as a risk factor for
other psychological difficulties, such as depression (Brown & Harris, 1978).
Therefore a summation of these risk factors may influence and or exacerbate the
PTSD difficulties and also account for the development of other disorders.
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5.5 Models ofPTSD
5.5.1 Psychoanalytical Model ofPTSD
Freud (1905) adhered to the idea that traumatic experiences, especially when they
occurred early in life, were the source of the pathogenic mental elements leading to
psychological conflict and symptom formation (Nemiah, 1997). Van der Kolk, et al
(1996) report that Freud adopted much of Charcot's ideas that the symptoms of
hysterical patients had their origins in histories of trauma. According to Nemiah
(1997) Freud viewed the personal self, or ego as possessing sufficient strength to
repress the traumatic memories and affects in order to protect itself from
experiencing the psychic pain associated with them. This differs from Janet's
account, which suggests that the personal self is weakened by a genetically
determined insufficiency of psychological energy. Therefore, when a person
experiences a traumatic life event, the psychological energy expended by the painful
emotional reaction to trauma further depletes the energy available to the personal
self, and is unable to incorporate the memories of the events and associated feelings
into its structure. According to Nemiah (1989), Janet adhered to an ego-deficit model
of psychopathology, whilst Freud's formulation was based on a psychodynamic
conflict model of symptom-formation.
Breuer and Freud (1893) believed that something becomes traumatic because it is
dissociated and remains outside conscious awareness, referring to this state as
hypnoid hysteria (Van der Kolk, McFarlane & van der Hart 1997). Freud (1905)
originally proposed that an experience of sexual abuse was the specific cause of
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hysteria. However, Freud (1973) later developed the concept of "defense hysteria"
where he abandoned dissociation as the central process related to trauma, and
proposed that repressed instinctual wishes formed the foundation of the neurosis
(Van der Kolk, et al 1996). From this perspective, Freud argued that it was not the
actual memories of childhood trauma that are split from consciousness, but
unacceptable sexual and aggressive wishes of the child, which threatens the ego and
motivates defenses against the conscious awareness of these wishes (Van der Kolk et
al, 1997). Freud believed that adults reporting traumatic memories were actually
presenting with the recurrence of fantasies and feelings associated with early
pathogenic development distortions (Nemiah, 1997),
However during World War I, Freud (1920) revived the work of Janet and proposed
that it was the overwhelming intensity of the stressor, in the absence of abreactive
verbal or motor channels that led to intense affect difficulties (Van der Kolk, et al
1996).
Masson (1984) notes that the acceptance of psychoanalytic theory resulted in an
absence of research on the effects of real traumatic events on children's lives.
However according to Van der Kolk, et al (1996) it was the work ofKardiner (1941)
who defined PTSD for the remainder of the 20th century. Kardiner observed that
individuals presenting with traumatic neurosis developed a vigilance for and
sensitivity to environmental threat. Van der Kolk, et al (1996) also note that Kardiner
described from observations of his patients the "pathological traumatic syndrome"
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which consisted of an altered conception of the self in relation to the world, based on
being fixated on the trauma, chronic irritability, atypical dreams, startle reactions and
aggressive reactions. Crucial to Kardiner's theory was the re-enactment of the
original traumatic episode. Van der Kolk, et al (1996) note that although the work
undertaken by Kardiner was available for practical application when World War If
broke out, most of it was forgotten and required to be rediscovered during later
conflicts.
5,5,2 Cognitive Models ofPTSD
Dalgleish (1999) argues that a number of factors such as psychosocial factors, pre¬
morbid history of psychological problems, prior experience of trauma and perceived
threat to the victims own life although important in bringing order to trauma research
and generating new ideas remain descriptive. They do not provide a description of
how these factors interact and how different reactions to trauma evolve.
He argues that theoretical approaches to PTSD must have explanatory power to meet
the following conditions:
1) to explain the symptoms of re-experiencing, avoidance and hyperarousal
2) to account for the range of individual reactions to PTSD
3) to explain the effects of pre-morbid histoiy of psychological problems, social
support, attributional style and attitudes to emotional expression
4) to account for the efficacy of exposure-based treatments
5) to provide a coherent model of mind within which the four conditions above can
be realised.
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He goes on to describe a number of cognitive theories which are discussed below
which he believes can offer some explanatory power to account for the five
preconditions set out above.
5,5.3 Horowitz's Theory of PTSD
Horowitz (1973) developed his model from psychodynamic theory. Horowitz (1973)
describes that trauma related information must be processed through what he terms a
"completion tendency". That is the psychological need to match new information
with inner models based on older information and the revision of both until they
agree (Dalgleish, 1999). This is similar to Janet's argument that memories of intense
emotional experiences are not consistent with existing cognitive schemes. Following
a traumatic event Horowitz (1986) believed there was an initial stunned reaction,
followed by a period of information overload, where thoughts, memories and images
of the trauma could not be reconciled with current meaning structures. According to
Dalgleish (1999) there is an initial failure to "complete". A number of psychological
defence mechanisms then keep the traumatic information in the unconscious, this
leads to the individual experiencing a period of numbing and denial (Dalgleish,
1999). Horowitz (1986) argues that the trauma related information is maintained in
active memory by the completion tendency with the information breaking through
the psychological defences, intruding into consciousness. This is experienced as
nightmares, flashbacks and intrusive memories. It is this tension between the
completion tendency and the psychological defences that leads to periods of
oscillations between denial, numbing and intrusions, until the traumatic memories
can be integrated with long term meaning representations (Dalgleish, 1999). The
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failure to integrate these memories leads to post-traumatic reactions (Horowitz,
1986).
According to Dalgleish (1999) Horowitz's explanation of PTSD can explain
conditions 1, and 4, and to a limited extent part of the ways in which normal
reactions to trauma can become chronic (condition 2). However he does draw
attention to the limitations of this theory. He observes that this theory does not
account for the finding that some individuals develop PTSD and others do not or the
development of late onset PTSD (condition 2). Further, Dalgleish (1994) notes that
this theory does not account for a coherent model of mind, failing to explain the
nature of the existing schema structure and the way it fails to accommodate new
information from the traumatic experience (condition 5).
Figure 2. Horowitz's model ofPTSD
(Adapted from T. Dalgleish (1999): Chapter 10, Cognitive Theories of Post -
Traumatic Stress Disorder. Page 197)
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5.5.4 The Cognitive Appraisal Model: Janoff-Bulman
Janoff-Bulman (1985) developed the cognitive appraisal model of PTSD. According
to this theory PTSD is the result of assumptions about the self and the world being
shattered. The main formulation arising from this theory is the way in which
traumatic events produce changes in the victim's thoughts and beliefs and how these
changes play a role an important role in the emotional response to trauma (Janoff-
Bulman, 1992). According to Dalgleish (1999), the assumptions referred to in this
model include, the assumption of personal invulnerability; the perception of the
world as meaningful or comprehensible; and the view of the self in a positive light.
These assumptions provide structure and meaning, however they can be shattered
when faced with a traumatic experience, leading to hyperarousal, intrusion and
avoidance (Dalgleish, 1999). Dalgleish argues that a problem related to this theory is
the finding that pre-morbid psychological problems are a risk factor for the
development of PTSD. He argues that individuals holding pre-morbid negative
assumptions are unlikely to have them shattered by a traumatic experience.
Individuals holding negative assumptions are more likely to have their assumptions
confirmed. This point is addressed by Ehlers and Clark (2000). They argue that prior
beliefs (negative and positive) are important in that trauma victims with prior
negative beliefs about themselves may view the trauma as a confirmation of these
beliefs, whereas those holding positive beliefs may find them shattered as proposed
by Janoff-Bulman. Dalgleish (1999) argues that Janoff-Bulman's model does not
meet condition 5. He argues that there is little attempt to explain what processes are
involved when the assumptions are shattered. These processes have been elaborated
by Ehlers and Clark (2000) and will be discussed in section 5.5.8.
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5,5.5 Foa's Fear Network
Foa and Kozak (1986) Foa, Zinbarg and Rothbaum (1992) based their model on
Lang's (1977) theory of fear structures. Lang (1977) suggested that emotional
images are constructed from three main classes of propositional unit, one concerned
with stimulus information; one with response information and one the meaning of the
situation. The fear network related to trauma centres on the stimulus information
about the trauma; information about cognitive, behavioural and physiological
reactions to the trauma and information which links these stimulus and response
elements together (Dalgleish, 1999). Foa et al (1992) argue that the trauma-related
fear network can be activated by cue stimuli, which then causes information held in
the network to enter consciousness. Avoidance symptoms come from the attempts to
avoid and suppress activation of the network (Foa et al 1992). Foa and Riggs (1993)
suggest that the trauma memory of an individual with PTSD is distinguished by
representations of the world as indiscriminately dangerous and of the self as an
inadequate coper. According to the fear network theory, two conditions are required
for the reduction of tear. First, the fear memory must be activated, and secondly, new
information must be provided, including elements that are incompatible with existing
pathological elements in the structure, so that a new memory can be formed
(Rothbaum and Foa, 1993). Also included in this model are the influences of
unpredictability and uncontrollability which is suggested can make it difficult to
assimilate into existing models in which the world is controllable and predictable.
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Dalgleish (1999) suggests that Foa et al's (1992) fear network has taken a big step
towards a greater understanding of how the processes underlying PTSD might
operate within a cognitive system. He argues that this model meets conditions 3 and
4. He argues however that this theory may not be powerful enough to cope with the
range of PTSD phenomenology or why fear networks develop in some individuals
and not in others.
5.5.6 Dual Representation Theory
Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph (1996) have proposed a dual representation theory for
PTSD. According to the dual representation theory, memories of a personally
experienced traumatic event can be of two distinct types (Brewin, 2001). The
individuals conscious experience of the trauma is the first level of representation.
Brewin et al (1996) refer to this as Verbally Accessible Memories (VAMS). Dalgleish
(1997) states that VAMS are characterised by their ability to be deliberately retrieved
and progressively edited by the traumatised individual. Like Foa and Kozak's (1986),
fear network theory, Dalgleish (1999) argues that VAMS, contain sensory, response
and meaning information. Brewin (2001) describes VAMS as supporting ordinary
autobiographical memories that can be retrieved either automatically or using
deliberate strategic processes. VAMS although readily available for verbal
communication are restricted due to mediated limited-capacity serial processing,
such as attention (Brewin, 2001). It is suggested that the emotions that accompany
VAM memories involve cognitive appraisals occurring both during the trauma and
after the trauma, as the individual considers the consequences and implications of the
event (Brewin, 2001).
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The second level of representation consists of Situationally Accessible Memories
(SAMS). SAMS unlike VAMS contain infonnation, that cannot be deliberately
retrieved nor edited. SAMS according to this theory can only be accessed when
aspects of the original traumatic situation cue their activation (Dalgleish, 1999).
Brewin et al (1996) propose that the SAM system contains information that has been
obtained from more extensive, lower level perceptual processing of the traumatic
scene. This would include visuospatial information that has received little conscious
processing, and of the person's bodily response to it, such as autonomic and motor
responses (Brewin, 2001).
Brewin (2001) argues that activation of SAM representation can account for
flashbacks, which are more detailed and affect-laden than ordinary memories, and
because the SAM system does not use a verbal code these memories are difficult to
communicate to others and do not necessarily interact with other autobiographical
knowledge. Brewin (2001) also suggests that the emotions that accompany SAM
memories are restricted to those that were experienced during the trauma or
subsequent moments of intense arousal. These consist of fear, helplessness and
horror.
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Figure 3. : A diagram of the dual representation model ofPTSD
(Adapted from T. Dalgleish (1999):Chapter 10, Cognitive Theories of Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder. Page 202).
According to Dalgleish (1999) the dual representation theory offers a coherent
account of the phenomenology of PTSD. He argues that this theory can account for
preconditions 1, 2, 3 and 4. He also argues that the theory can offer a coherent
model of mind which can incorporate the other 4 preconditions. However as Brewin
(2001) suggests although the theory is consistent with clinical observations it has
received limited empirical evaluation.
5,5.7 The Schematic, Prepositional, Associative and Analogical Representational
Systems (SPAARS)
Dalgleish (1999) considers one other cognitive approach to PTSD. This is the
Schematic, Prepositional, Associative and Analogical Representational Systems
(SPAARS) (Power and Dalgleish, 1997). This model views emotions as adaptive
85
processes which reorganises the cognitive system in different ways to deal with
changes in both the internal and external environment (Dalgleish, 1999). The
SPAARS model is an appraisal-based model of emotion comprising four levels of
representation of information.
Figure 4. The basic architecture of the SPAARS model
(Adapted from T. Dalgleish (1999):Chapter 10, Cognitive Theories of Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder. Page 205).
The analogical representation system store information and memories in analogical
form. This includes visual, olfactory, auditory, gustatory and proprioceptive images,
including memories of specific events, fragments of events from an individual's life,
or representations of the properties of objects, smells and sounds (Dalgleish, 1999).
Propositional representations according to Power and Dalgleish (1997) are believed
to be the encodings of verbal information, which also include beliefs, ideas and
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objects and concepts and the relations between them in a form which is not specific
to any language. This level in SPAARS is responsible for the storage of semantic
facts about the world, as well as episodic memories of events in an individual's life.
The schematic model representation refers to higher-order representations of
ideational content (Dalgleish, 1999). This is the way in which, higher-order
ideational content which, cannot be expressed in language is represented. For
example Dalgleish (1999) offers an explanation of this type of representation using
the belief of the world as a safe place. The model of the world as a safe place from
the schematic representation will contain more complexity than is thought to be
captured by the propositional level. From the schematic level it will incorporate all
aspects of what safety means to the individual, and guides the way in which
information is processed and organised within the system (Dalgleish, 1999).
The fourth level of the SPAARS model is the associative level of representation.
This level of representation involves automatised emotions which are generated in a
way which do not involve appraisal with respect to the individual's goals at the time
of the event's occurrence (Dalgleish, 1999). The associative level of representation
suggests that emotions can be automatised in two ways, 1) through repetition of an
event-emotion pairing and 2) when the event is biologically prepared as has been
described by Seligman's theory of preparedness (as described in chapter 1).
The SPAARS model accounts for PTSD within the following framework. During a
trauma, information about the event is appraised at the schematic level, in a threat-
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related way leading to an experience of intense fear (Dalgleish, 1999). It has then
been suggested that trauma-related information is encoded and represented at the
analogical, propositional and schematic levels of meaning (Power and Dalgleish,
1997). This information is believed to be unintegrated with the individual's dominant
schematic model of the self, world and others. This pattern of representation
according to Dalgleish (1999) can explain the symptoms which are characteristic of
PTSD and related problems.
Re-experiencing, is accounted for by the SPAARS model from the following
perspective. Following a traumatic event, the appraisal system at the schematic
model level will attempt to process the unintegrated trauma-related information. This
information will be appraised as incompatible and as a threat to the existing model of
the self and the world (Dalgleish, 1999). This continual processing of trauma-related
information leads to activation and re-activation of the fear model with the individual
re-experiencing the traumatic event. Flashbacks to the event are believed to occur
due to the fact that little assimilation with other information in memory has occurred.
According to Dalgleish (1999), flashbacks can involve reactivation of unintegrated
information at all levels within SPAARS. This includes the associative level, which
will activate fear as a function of the repetitions during intrusions of the link between
trauma-related information and fear. These intrusive phenomena will lead the
individual to undertake a number of processes to avoid any reminders of the event.
Hyperarousal is explained as a consequence, of the process of the existence of
unintegrated traumatic information in memory. Thus individuals whose processing
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resources are continually being utilised by appraising the incompatibility of
unintegrated trauma-related information in memory are likely to experience
symptoms of hyperarousal (Dalgleish, 1999).
The SPAARS model also accounts for individual differences at the schematic level
of representation. For example some individuals may hold models of the world as
being a moderately safe place. In contrast, some individuals may hold models of the
world as completely safe. According to the SPAARS model various ways of dealing
with incompatible information would have been developed throughout the person's
emotional history. Involving denying the incompatible information or emotionally
processing the information. It is argued that the majority of individuals will,
following an initial period of post-traumatic reactions, be able to integrate the
traumatic information into their models of the self, others and the world. This may
explain why the prevalence of PTSD following traumatic incidents is low. Those
individuals with overvalued models about their world, self and others will have
difficulties integrating the incompatible information and will be more at risk of
developing PTSD (Dalgleish, 1999).
Dalgleish (1999) argues that the SPAARS model can account for all the pre¬
conditions mentioned earlier. It meets pre-condition 1 as it can account for the three
central constellations of problems in PTSD. It can account for the number of
individual reactions to trauma (pre-condition 2.). It can account for processes such as
attributional style (pre-condition 3) and implications for therapy (pre-condition4).
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Finally, according to Dalgleish it provides a coherent architecture in which PTSD
can be understood (pre-condition 5).
5.5.8 Ehlers and Clarks Cognitive Model of PTSD.
Ehlers and Clark (2000) have proposed a model to explain the persistence of PTSD.
Their model draws on some of the work already described by Daigleish (1999) above
including, Brewin et al (1996) and Janoff-Bulman (1992). Ehlers and Clark (2000)
provide an overview of one of the main puzzles related to PTSD. That is the
classification of PTSD as an anxiety disorder (DSM-IV). They argue that within
cognitive models, anxiety is a result of appraisals related to impending threat,
however PTSD is a disorder in which the problem is a memory for an event that has
already happened. The authors suggest that the puzzle can be resolved by proposing
that persistent PTSD occurs only if individuals process the traumatic event and/or/it's
sequelae in a way which produces a sense of a serious current threat. The authors
propose two processes which can lead to a sense of current threat: 1) individual
differences in the appraisal of the trauma and /or its sequelae and 2) individual
differences in the nature of the memory for the event and its link to other
autobiographical memories. Ehlers and Clark (2000) argue that once activated, the
perception of current threat is accompanied by intrusions, reexperiencing symptoms,
symptoms of arousal, anxiety and other emotional responses. The perceived threat
also motivates a set of behavioural and cognitive responses that reduce the perceived
threat and distress in the short-term, but have the consequence of preventing
cognitive change, which then leads to maintenance of the disorder.
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Ehlers and Clark (2000) argue that individuals with persistent PTSD are unable to
see the trauma as a time-limited event that does not have global negative implications
for their future. They also propose that several types of appraisal can be made
regarding the event, and that each appraisal can produce a sense of current threat. For
example, it is suggested that individuals overgeneralise from the trauma event and as
a consequence perceive a range of normal activities as more dangerous than they
really are. Trauma survivors may also exaggerate the probability of further
catastrophes, and may appraise the way they felt or behaved during the event, that
may be perceived as indicating personal responsibility for the event's causality.
Individuals also make appraisals of trauma sequelae, believing for example, that
intrusive memories indicate that they are losing control of their mind. The
consequence of this, is that many individuals attempt to suppress intrusive memories
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Active thought suppression is known to make thoughts more
likely to come to mind (Wegner, 1989), therefore this strategy for dealing with this
type of appraisal is paradoxically likely to maintain it rather than ameliorate their
difficulties.
Ehlers and Clark (2000) also draw attention to the nature of trauma memory and its
relationship to unwanted recollections. Individuals with PTSD often report
difficulties in intentionally retrieving a complete memory of the traumatic event.
Intentional recall is often found to be fragmented and poorly organised, with
difficulty recalling the exact temporal order of events (Foa & Riggs, 1993; van der
Kolk & Fisler, 1995).
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However individuals with PTSD persistently report a high frequency of involuntarily
triggered intrusive memories, which Ehlers and Clark (2000) state require to be
explained within existing models of PTSD. They also suggest that re-experiencing of
the event has a number of important characteristics that need to be explained. These
include:
♦ Re-experiencing mainly consists of sensory impressions, rather than elaborated
thoughts. The impressions involve all modalities including physical sensations.
♦ The sensory impressions are experienced as if they were happening right now
rather than being memories from the past and the emotions (including physical
and behavioural responses) accompanying them are the same as those
experienced at the time.
♦ The original emotions and sensory impressions are re-experienced even if the
individual later acquires new information that contradicts the original impression
of it.
♦ Individuals may re-experience physiological sensations or emotions that were
associated with the traumatic event without a recollection of the event. Schacter,
Norman and Koutstaal (1997) refer to this as lack of source information.
♦ The involuntary re-experiencing of the traumatic event is triggered by a wide
range of stimuli and situations. Many of the trigger stimuli are cues that do not
have a strong semantic relationship to the traumatic event, but are cues that were
temporally associated with the event, e.g. physical cues similar to those before or
during the event.
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Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that in persistent PTSD one of the main problems is
that the trauma memory is poorly elaborated and inadequately integrated into its
context in time, place, subsequent and previous information and other
autobiographical memories. Brewin et al (1996) propose two routes to the retrieval of
autobiographical information. The first route is via higher-order meaning-based
retrieval strategies (e.g. first day at school). The second route is through direct
triggering by stimuli that were associated with the event (smells). According to
Ehlers and Clark (2000) the nonnal processing of autobiographical memories
appears to have the function of reducing the ease with which memories of past
experiences are unintentionally retrieved while an individual engages in everyday
tasks. It is suggested that this type of organisation enhances the first retrieval route
and inhibits the second. This has the effect that when an autobiographical memory
enters consciousness, it comprises both specific information about the event general
information about the lifetime period of the event and abstracted information about
the type of event in general (Ehlers and Clark, 2000). Thus according to Ehlers and
Clark (2000), this process can explain problematic intentional recall (weak semantic
route to retrieval), the "here and now" quality of sensory impressions (no context in
time) and the absence of links to subsequent information and the easy triggering by
physically similar cues.
Ehlers and Clarks (2000) also propose strong stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-
response associations influencing trauma-related difficulties. Distinct stimuli present
shortly or during the event become associated with danger. Retrieval from
associative memory is cue-driven and unintentional, therefore the individual may not
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be aware of the triggers for reexperiencing and may not be aware that their emotional
reaction is due to activation of the trauma memory. According to this proposal,
failure to spot the origin of the reexperiencing symptoms makes it difficult for the
patient to learn that there is no present danger when exposed to the trauma.
Strong, perceptual priming of stimuli temporally associated with the trauma, is also
proposed by this model. It is argued that as a consequence of the reduced perceptual
threshold, cues that were associated with the trauma and that consequently can
directly trigger the trauma memory are more likely to be noticed. Baddeley (1997)
suggests that individuals with PTSD elicit poor stimulus discrimination, with the
result that reexperiencing symptoms occur, even if the context in which the stimulus
configuration is observed is very different.
Ehlers and Clark (2000) also propose that a reciprocal relationship exists between the
nature of the trauma memory and the appraisals of the trauma and its sequelae.
Recall of the trauma is biased by the individual's appraisals, and selectively retrieved
information which is consistent with these appraisals. They also suggest that due to
the inability to recall specific or well-elaborated details of the trauma, individuals
may catastrophically appraise this as a sign that something is wrong with their brain.
Ehlers and Clark (2000) point out however that many of these cognitive strategies,
such as selective retrieval and attention to threat may not always have an intentional
quality, but are also likely to occur through automatic triggering as well as strategic
responses.
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Types of cognitive processing during the trauma is an essential element according to
this model of PTSD. The two processes that lead to a current threat, appraisals of the
trauma and its sequelae and the nature of the trauma memory are known to be
influenced by the type of cognitive processing during the traumatic event. Mental
defeat (Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers, 1997) has been identified as a correlate of chronic
PTSD. Mental defeat is described as the perceived loss of all psychological
autonomy, accompanied by the sense of not being human any longer (Ehlers &
Clark, 2000). Patients presenting with mental defeat are believed to interpret the
trauma as evidence for a negative view of themselves, such as not being a worthy
person, or that they are permanently damaged by the trauma (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
The influence on trauma memory is believed to be dependent on the quality of
processing at encoding. Roediger (1990) describes two types of encoding; conceptual
and data-driven. It is believed that data-driven processing (processing the sensory
impressions of the trauma) will make the trauma memory difficult to retrieve
intentionally, as there has been no conceptual processing, where the meaning of the
trauma is processed in an organised way and is placed into context.
Ehlers and Clark (2000) argue that their model also accounts for a number of
background factors that may also influence cognitive processing during a traumatic
event. These include: 1) the duration and predictability of the event; 2) previous
traumatic experiences and coping styles; 3) prior beliefs and 4) state factors, such as
alcohol consumption and arousal state.
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Finally, Ehlers and Clark (2000) also argue that delayed onset PTSD can be
explained by their model. They draw on the work of Davey (1989) who described
UCS re-evaluation (chapter 1). This is a process by which the individual's evaluation
of the UCS is changed over time. This can occur due to the individual acquiring
novel information, which suggests that the UCS is now more aversive. Ehlers and
Clark (2000) argue that delayed onset PTSD occurs because some later event gives
the original trauma or its sequelae a more threatening meaning.
The model proposed by Ehlers and Clark (2000) would appear to meet the
preconditions established by Dalgleish (1999). It can account for individual reactions
to trauma. It includes pre-morbid histories, the theoretical basis for exposure-based
treatment, and provides a coherent theory of mind in which PTSD can be understood.
The cognitive models discussed do appear to account for a number of the conditions
set out by Dalgleish (1999). With the models having as their basis much of Janet's
original accounts of the failure to properly integrate traumatic memories. The
proposition put forward by the Dual Representation Model that SAMS can only be
accessed when aspects of the original traumatic situation cue their activation does not
appear to be supported by the literature or clinical observations. Keane, Zimering and
Caddell (1985) reported that amongst Vietnam veterans a broad range of stimuli (not
present during the original trauma) evoked anxiety and trauma-related symptoms.
They argued that this was due to higher-order conditioning (the pairing of a CS with
a neutral stimulus that then becomes a higher order CS, evoking a CR). They also
suggested that stimulus generalisation could account for these findings (the more
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similar a novel situation is to a conditioned response, the stronger the response will
be to that new stimulus). Ehlers and Clark's (2000) model also proposes that the
involuntary reexperiencing of the traumatic event can be triggered by a wide range of
stimuli and situations.
The cognitive models ofPTSD do not offer any explanations as to the neural basis of
the different types of memory processes involved in the interaction of PTSD. This
will be discussed in the following section
5.5.9 Psychobiology of PTSD
Van der Kolk (1996) suggests that the core disturbance in PTSD is the inability to
regulate arousal. He argues that the persistence of intrusive and repetitious thoughts
may be influence by the process of kindling (a process in epilepsy where there is
lowering of the seizure threshold after repeated electrical stimulation, as though the
brain was learning or being trained to fit. It has been suggested that a similar model
may apply to PTSD and that long-term changes in the excitability of the brain may
occur making stress responses more easily triggered, which sets up a chronically
disordered pattern of arousal (Freeman & Flitcroft 2000).
Van der Kolk (1996) suggests that the psychophysiological effects of trauma occur
on two different levels: 1) in response to specific reminders of the trauma, and 2) in
response to intense but neutral stimuli, suggesting a loss of stimulus discrimination.
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Kolb and Multipassi (1982) have demonstrated that individuals with PTSD respond
to specific reminders of the trauma with increases in heart rate, skin conductance and
blood-pressure. Pitman, Orr and Shalev (1993) noted that this elevated arousal was
observed even to traumas that occurred decades previously. Medication known to
stimulate the autonomic arousal system (ANS) such as yohimbine has been shown to
induce flashbacks and panic attacks in patients with PTSD, it is believed that
yohimbine activates central noradrenergic neurons (Southwick, Krystal & Morgan,
1993). Lang (1979) also reported that emotionally laden mental images are
accompanied by increased ANS activity.
Excessive stimulation of the CNS at the time of the traumatic event is believed to
result in permanent neuronal changes, that effect learning, habituation and stimulus
discrimination (Kolb, 1987). Van der Kolk (1996) notes that these neuronal changes
do not depend on actual exposure to reminders of the trauma for expression. Ross,
Ball & Cohen (1989) have observed abnormalities in habituation to the acoustic
startle response amongst individuals with PTSD. Van der Kolk (1996) suggest that
traumatised individuals have difficulty in evaluating sensory stimuli and mobilizing
appropriate levels of physiological arousal.
Certain neurohormones, such as the catecholamines e.g. norepinephrine, serotonin,
and glucocorticoids have been implicated in PTSD. Urinary norepinephrine (NE)
levels have been found to be elevated in PTSD combat veterans compared with
patients with other psychiatric disorders (Kosten, Mason, Giller, Ostroff and
Harkness, 1987). A study by Shalev et al (1998) found that an increase in adrenergic
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response as opposed to noradrenergic activation appeared to contribute to the
development of PTSD. Basing their hypotheses on Mowrer's (1960) two-factor
theory of classical conditioning, Shalev et al (1998) argued that the physiological
component of the response (UCR) to trauma at the time of its occurrence may
influence post-trauma outcome. They investigated heart-rate and blood pressure
measures in trauma survivors at arrival to accident and emergency, one week later
and at four months following the trauma. They found that subjects who developed
PTSD had higher rates at both the first and second time periods. There were no
differences at the four month heart-rate measure for the PTSD group and non-PTSD
group. Blood-pressure, did not differentiate the groups at any of the time periods.
They reported that the heart rate difference was not accounted for by rated intensity
of the trauma. From within their conditioning model perspective of PTSD, they
interpreted the elevated heart-rate findings in the PTSD group as reflecting higher
intensity of the UCR. They also propose that excessive adrenergic activation may
contribute to the development of PTSD through enhanced memory consolidation of
the traumatic event (UCS).
A recent study by Bryant, Harvey, Guthrie and Moulds (in press) measured heart
rates amongst individuals who had been involved in road traffic accidents. They
found that heart rates obtained before the patients were discharged from hospital
were significantly higher in those who later developed PTSD. These findings may
be related to Forsyth and Eifert's (1995) suggestion that learned alarms may become
associated with interoceptive cues through a process of interoceptive conditioning
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(see chapter 1) and McNally and Lukaach's (1992) proposal that aversive bodily
sensations are capable of producing PTSD.
Cortisol levels have been found to be lower in individuals with PTSD (Mason, Giller,
& Kosten 1986) even although the human stress response is associated with elevated
Cortisol levels. McFarlane, Atchison and Yehuda (1997) found lowered serum
Cortisol amongst survivors of road traffic accidents who later developed PTSD. This
is in contrast to other groups e.g. depressed patients who have been found to have
significantly higher levels of Cortisol (Scott, 2000). Yehuda, Southwick, Mason and
Giller (1990) explain this paradoxical finding in PTSD due to Cortisol's function as
an "antistress" hormone. They argue that activation of Cortisol (and catecholamines
such as NE) stimulate active coping behaviours. However increased arousal in the
presence of low Cortisol levels provokes undifferentiated fight or flight reactions and
may contribute to dysfunctional elevated arousal.
However it is not clear if the lower Cortisol levels are as a consequence of a chronic
heightened arousal or that individuals developing PTSD have vulnerable
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis.
Serotonin, has also been found to be implicated in PTSD symptomatology.
Southwick et al (1993) administered a serotonin agonist (a drug that mimics a certain
neurotransmitter). They found that a number of the participants experienced panic
attacks, with a slightly lower number experiencing flashbacks.
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It is known that when individuals are under severe stress, the secretion of these
aforementioned hormones influences how memories are laid down (van der Kolk,
1997). It is believed that NE input to the amygdala is involved in the
overconsolidtaion of traumatic memories (Le Doux, 1995). Van der Kolk (1994)
argues that although physiological arousal can trigger-trauma-related memories,
conversely, flashbacks may trigger a re-release of stress hormones, which further
kindle the memory trace.
Van der Kolk (1994) highlights both the amygdala and the hippocampus as parts of
the limbic system involved in the processing of emotionally charged memories (see
chapter 1 for a review of amygdala and hippocampal function). Le Doux, Romanski
and Xagoraris (1991) found in a series of animal studies that electrical stimulation of
the amygdala produced conditioned fear responses. They also found that cortical
lesions prevented the extinction of these responses. Penfield and Perot (1963) elicited
memories through direct stimulation of structures in the temporal lobe, including the
amygdala and hippocampus, with some subjects reexperiencing frightening events.
Hippocampal volume has also found to be decreased in individuals with PTSD.
Bremner, Randall & Scott (1995) observed an 8% reduction in the right hippocampus
in Vietnam combat veterans with PTSD. The right hemisphere is believed to be
involved in evaluating the emotional significance of incoming information and in
regulating autonomic and hormonal responses to these stimuli (van der kolk, 1997).
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Rauch, van der kolk, Fisler & Alpert (1996) carried out a positron emission
tomagrophy study with patients with PTSD. During exposure to narratives of their
traumatic experiences, heightened activity in the right hemisphere was observed. The
most active part of the brain was the amygdala. In contrast Broca's area (the part
responsible for translating personal experience into communicable language) showed
a decrease in oxygen during the exposure. The authors concluded that during
activation of the traumatic memory, the brain is "having" its experience. The
individual relives and experiences the sensory elements of the experience, however
this physiological activity may prevent the experience being translated into
communicable language.
This biological finding may offer support for the dual representation models of
PTSD. Where it is believed that successful resolution of PTSD symptoms can occur
when information is transferred from SAM to VAM memory (Brewin et al, 1995).
5.5.10 Integrative Cognitive Neuroscience Account of PTSD
Brewin (2001) proposes that a plausible model of PTSD should draw on both
biological and psychological knowledge to develop an integrative account of the
processes involved in the disorder. Again an integrative account does not move to far
from Janet's belief that biologically based trauma responses result in fragmentation
ofmental cohesion, biological, cognitive and emotional dysfunction.
From the biological perspective he proposes that both the amygdala and
hippocampus are key structures in understanding responses to threat, including fear
102
conditioning and the return of fear. As discussed earlier it is known that the
acquisition of fear can be mediated by subcortical and cortical pathways. Projections
from the hippocampus and from prefrontal cortex have the capacity to inhibit the
activation of the amygdala (LeDoux,1995). However in unfamiliar contexts where
there are no safety cues or in contexts associated with threat no inhibition takes place
and the original fear response is reinstated (Brewin, 2001). He argues that return of
fear may be in response to low-level perceptual features of the original learning
situation, that has received little conscious processing and thus do not figure in
verbally accessible memory (VAM).
Brewin's model infers that the hippocampal processing of fear-evoking information
results in the laying down of integrated, coherent representations of conscious
experience. These representations are located in the appropriate temporal and spatial
context (Brewin, 2001). According to Brewin (2001) it is possible for information to
reach the amygdala via a number of different routes, independently of the
hippocampus. He points to the visual areas of the inferior temporal cortex, which are
involved in the late stages of sensory processing, which project to the amygdala. The
thalamo-amygdala route according to Brewin (2001) has a less sophisticated
processing capacity and would be capable of transmitting lower-level sensory
features. Therefore memories processed via these routes would not be available for
deliberate recall, but would be accessed automatically by perceptual cues, similar to
those held in the fear memory.
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Incorporating recent findings of the effects on stress on the hippocampus and
amygdala (Metcalfe and Jacobs, 1998). Brewin (2001) proposes that the physiology
of the hippocampus under acute stress mirrors the Yerkes-Dodson inverted-u shaped
function for cognitive performance. Glucocorticoid exposure first increases
activation of hippocampal neurons, however neuronal activation then declines,
resulting in impaired hippocampal function due to increased stress. Declarative
memory will be effected, with less evidence of binding of individual features into a
coherent whole or location in a temporal and spatial context (Brewin, 2001; Metcalfe
and Jacobs, 1998). The function of the amygdala however under stress is reported to
be enhanced (Pitman, Shalev & Orr, 2000).
Brewin (2001) proposes that the mechanisms of these memory systems and the
effects of stress upon them, provide a plausible neural substrate for the dual
representation model proposed by Brewin et al (1996). He notes that in particular,
this integrative model can account for flashbacks. He suggests that the features of
flashbacks (automatically elicited under limited conscious control, stereotyped and
unchanged even after many recall episodes and experienced in the present, without
any associated temporal context) are suggestive of a non-hippocampally dependent
form ofmemory (SAM).
Brewin (2001) suggests that flashbacks play a critical role in transferring information
from the non-hippocampally dependent SAM memory system to the hippocampally
based VAM system. It follows that by deliberately focussing attention on the content
of the flashbacks, the sensory information can be effectively recoded (Brewin, 2001).
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Rather than memories being coded without present and past discrimination, the
hippocampus will locate the event it its appropriate context. This process however
will be utilised using a limited-capacity system due to the transfer being undertaken
by working memory. Therefore according to Brewin (2001) repeated flashbacks will
be required to promote information transfer and amygdala inhibition. However also
of importance is the individuals capacity to attend and process flashbacks, avoidance
or distraction from these experiences will inhibit transfer of information.
Brewin's (2001) integrative model expands the cognitive conceptualisation of the
Dual Representation model of PTSD discussed in the earlier section. Inclusion of
neuroanatomical data which supports a distinction between hippocampally-
dependent and non-hippocampally dependent forms of memory does appear to offer
support for the separate memory systems identified in the Dual Representation
model. This however still requires to be empirically investigated.
5.6 Treatment of PTSD
Van der Kolk, McFarlane and Hart (1996) propose that the aim of treatment with
traumatised patients is to help them move from being "stuck" on the trauma, to being
fully engaged in the present, and becoming capable of responding to current
exigencies. Van der hart, Brown and van der Kolk (1989) emphasise the following
treatment phases:
1) Stabilisation including education and identification of feelings through
verbalising somatic states.
2) Deconditioning of traumatic memories and responses
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3) Restructuring of traumatic personal schemas
4) Reestablishment of secure social connections and interpersonal efficacy
5) Accumulation of restitutive emotional experiences
A number of treatments have been proposed for PTSD. Guidelines for treatment of
PTSD (International Society of Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS) have recently been
published (Foa, Keane and Friedman, 2000) in which a number of treatments have
been evaluated for their efficacy.
The standard treatment for PTSD generally involves two elements, prolonged
exposure (PE) (in vivo and imaginal) and cognitive restructuring including the
modification ofmaladaptive beliefs about events, behaviours or symptoms associated
with the trauma. The theoretical basis for implementing PE therapy is based on
Lang's (1977) theory of fear (Foa and Kozak 1986). Eliciting the fear structure
allows habituation and also constitutes an opportunity for corrective information to
be integrated (Rothbaum & Foa, 1997). During PE sessions patients are asked to
describe the event as if it was happening in the present and in the first person.
Emphasis should be placed on engagement with the range of emotions experienced
during the trauma (Bryant & Flarvey, 2000). Foa and Riggs (1993) suggest that the
repeated reliving in PE, generates a more organised memory record that can be
readily integrated with existing schemata. Friedman (2000) also suggests that PE can
abolish the conditioned emotional response evoked by traumatic stimuli, thus
reducing the amount of avoidance behaviour associated with maintaining the
symptoms.
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Bryant and Harvey (2000) argue that in vivo PE has been poorly investigated in
PTSD, with most studies including in vivo exposure secondary to imaginal exposure.
A study by Richards, Lovell and Marks (1994) found that in vivo exposure was more
effective than imaginal exposure in reducing avoidance symptoms.
Van der Hart and Spiegal (1993) however argue that probably the most important
factor operating during PE (and it must be assumed through different treatment
modalities) is the importance of the therapeutic alliance. They criticise behavioural
therapists in their neglect to write about the intensely personal element in the
psychotherapeutic alliance. They suggest that forming a new non-traumatic structure
may arise from the fact the patient is able to confront the traumatic memory with a
trusted therapist in a safe environment.
Rothbaum, Meadows, Resick and Foy (2000) (guidelines for treatment) found that
the evidence for PE treatment was very compelling from a number ofwell-controlled
treatment trials. In twelve studies all reported positive results. The studies involved a
number of different traumatised groups including, Vietnam veterans, female assault
victims and mixed variety of traumas. In the review of treatment guidelines,
Rothbaum et al (2000) recommend that PE should be the first line of treatment,
unless reasons exist for ruling it out.
Some studies have reported efficacy for systematic desensitisation (SD) (Wolpe,
1958), in which patients are exposed to fear eliciting stimuli (in vivo or imaginal) in
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a state of relaxation. Frank and Stewart (1983) reported that SD was effective in
reducing PTSD symptoms in rape victims, however there was no control group and
PTSD measures were not used. Rothbaum et al (2000) found that studies assessed for
the treatment guidelines, which involved SD were mostly methodologically flawed.
Although cognitive patterns in PTSD are considered important, according to Bryant
and Harvey (2000) there has been little investigation of the role of cognitive therapy
(CT) in facilitating trauma resolution. The difficulty in assessing ifCT is an effective
treatment for PTSD is due to studies, which integrate CT with PE (Resick &
Schnicke, 1993). Tarrier and Humphreys (2000) allocated patients with PTSD to
either a PE or CT group. CT was based on Beck and Emery (1985) and Resick and
Schnicke (1993). CT was emotion focussed, eliciting patients beliefs about the
meaning of the event and the attributions they made following the trauma.
Maladaptive cognitions and patterns of emotions were identified and modified. PE
was trauma focussed and aimed to produce habituation of emotional responses
associated with the trauma. Exposure to the memory continued until emotional
reactions decreased. It was found that patients in the PE group showed greater
improvement (subjective ratings of symptoms) than the CT group, with the
improvement in the PE group occurring after session eight. It is possible however
that PE does lead to cognitive restructuring. Jaycox and Foa (1996) suggest that
during exposure individuals learn that fear-based beliefs are not reality based.
However Bryant and Harvey (2000) challenge this assumption as they argue that
entrenched beliefs relating to guilt or anger may not necessarily be modified through
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habituation. Only two CT controlled studies were evaluated for the ITSS guidelines
for treatment, with the initial evidence supporting the use ofCT.
Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs and Murdock (1991) conducted a study comparing PE
(imaginal), stress inoculation training (SIT), supportive counselling and a waiting list
control. They found that PE and SIT were significantly superior to supportive
counselling on PTSD symptoms, but not on depression and anxiety. Marks, Lovell,
Noshirvani, Livanou and Thrasher (1998) randomised patients with PTSD into four
treatment groups, PE, cognitive restructuring, combined PE and cognitive
restructuring and relaxation. Their results showed that all four groups improved
significantly. However at three and six month follow-up PE, was slightly superior to
cognitive restructuring and the combined group. Rothbaum et al (2000) concluded
that combined approaches (CBT) have not resulted in significantly more
improvements when compared to single treatments, such as PE. However recent
Department of Health Guidelines (2000), based on systematically reviewed research
suggests CBT as the therapy of choice for PTSD, including systematic
desensitization , which as reported above has not been found to be conclusive due to
methodologically, flawed research.
Another treatment purported to be effective in the treatment of PTSD is Eye
Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR) (Shapiro, 1995). During
EMDR it is proposed that saccadic eye movements reprogram brain function so that
the emotional impact of a trauma can be resolved (Friedman, 2000). The patient is
asked to imagine a painful, traumatic memory and an associated negative cognition.
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The patient is then asked to articulate an incompatible positive cognition. The
therapist then asks the patient to think about the traumatic memory while focussing
on the rapid eye movements of the clinicians fingers. Following periods of 10-12 eye
movements, the patient is asked to rate the strength of the traumatic memory and the
belief in the positive outcome (Friedman, 2000). A number of positive results have
bee reported for the efficacy of EMDR (Shapiro, 1995; Wilson, Becker & Tinker,
1995; Rothbaum, 1997). However Bryant and Harvey (2000) report that a number of
studies reporting successful outcome are limited due to the lack of blind assessments,
reliance on self-report data and ambiguity about pre-treatment PTSD severity.
Research also suggests that eye movements are not necessary for EMDR to work.
Finger tapping (Bauman & Melnyk, 1994) has also been used and was found to be
effective as eye movements (Friedman, 2000). According to Friedman (2000) the
actual mechanisms by which EMDR works is poorly understood. Hyer and
Brandsma (1997) suggest that EMDR works, due to:
♦ EMDR supports a belief that therapy will lead to positive growth
♦ Patients select the traumatic material, which they process in their own ways and
at their own paces, this differs EMDR from PE which is a directive approach
♦ EMDR bypasses the intense interpersonal issues between patient and clinician
that are emphasised in the transference reaction in psychoanalytic psychotherapy.
Brewin (2001) proposes that dual representation theory can offer an explanation for
the possible mechanisms for EMDR. He argues that the real-time stimulus provided
by the clinician's actions, impinge directly on the patient as they are attending to the
traumatic image. This could function to encode a very distinctive attribute with a
no
new VAM representation. Trauma reminders would then lead to the rapid
reinstatement of this memory in preference to the older representations (Brewin,
2001).
Bryant and Harvey (2000) argue that there is no evidence that EMDR provides any
additional benefits relative to PE. The ISTSS guidelines recommend that additional
studies be carried out that compare EMDR with other focussed PTSD treatments
(Chemtob, Tolin, van der Kolk and Pitman, 2000).
Pharmacotherapy has also been employed as a treatment for PTSD. The rationale for
drug therapy is based on the findings from the biological model of noradrenergic and
serotonergic dysfunction. Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) have been
reported to be effective in the treatment of PTSD (ISTSS guidelines), (Friedman,
Davidson, Mellman and Southwick, 2000). SSRIs have been found to be not only
useful for PTSD symptomatology but have been found to be useful for co-morbid
disorders, such as depression and panic disorder. Monoamine Oxidase Inhibitors
(MAOIs) have been found to show a moderate improvement in trauma
symptomatology (De Martino, Moiliea and Wilk, 1995). However these drugs are
limited in use due to serious consequences of non-compliance with dietary
restrictions. Tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) have not been found to be effective for
treatment of PTSD (Southwick, Yehuda and Giller, 1994). The ISTSS guidelines
recommend anxiolytics only for adjunctive time-limited treatment, especially sleep
disturbance or global anxiety.
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However there are a number of factors which may influence treatment outcome and
treatment type. The ISTSS guidelines consider a number of factors such as
comorbidity, suicidally, drug use and concurrent general medical conditions. Bryant
and Harvey (2000) also propose treatment obstacles, especially related to PE that
clinicians should be aware of, these include, anger, cultural issues and ongoing
stressors.
5.7 PTSD Related to Medical and Dental Events
Mayou and Smith (1997) report that post-traumatic symptoms, immediate, short-term
and long-term often present in general medical care. They argue that a number of
factors may influence the development of traumatic symptoms in both medical and
dental settings, e.g. investigations, severe acute illness and painful procedures.
Shalev, Schreiber, Galai and Melmed (1993) reported four case studies involving, the
emergence ofPTSD after cardiac catheterization, diagnosis of a meningioma, cardiac
arrest and a haemorrhaging artery. The authors argue that patients that have
undergone procedures involving a feeling of intense inescapable distress, lack of
control and perceived or actual threat to life may be at risk of developing PTSD.
They suggest that clinicians should be aware that patients presenting with intrusive
and distressing recollections of the event, avoidance of medical care and unexplained
delay in recovery should be further assessed for trauma-related difficulties.
Studies have also found prevalence rates of PTSD amongst Myocardial Infarction
(MI) survivors as between 8-16 per cent (Doefler, Pbert & DeCosimo 1994; Kutz,
Shabati, Solomon, Neumann & David, 1994). Bennett and Brooke (1999) reported a
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10 per cent prevalence rate for PTSD, twelve months following a MI. They found an
association between the frequency of intrusive thoughts and PTSD symptoms. They
also reported an association between the frequency of intrusive thoughts and
awareness of the episode being an MI. Owen, Koutsakisi and Bennett (2001)
reported that PTSD symptoms are relatively common following an Ml, however
most sufferers problems resolve. However, for a minority of those patients, their
symptoms are prolonged and create significant difficulties. The authors argue that
adjustments should be made in rehabilitation programmes to include screening for
those at risk ofPTSD following an MI.
PTSD and PTSD symptoms have also been found amongst patients following
subarachnoid haemorrhage (Berry, 1998), uncontrollable pain (Schreiber and Galai-
Gat 1993) cerebral vascular accident (Sembi, Tarrier, O'Neil, Burns and Faragher
1998) and following childbirth (Czarnocka and Slade, 2000). A number of studies
however report a low uptake of participants (Bennett and Brooke 1999), or low rate
ofPTSD diagnosis (Sembi et al, 1998). For example six patients from sixty-one were
found to have a PTSD diagnosis in Sembi et al's (1998) study. Eight patients from
two hundred and sixty four in the Czarnocka and Slade (2000) study showed
significant levels of PTSD symptoms. Whither this reflects a low prevalence of
PTSD amongst medical and surgical disorders or difficulty in meeting the strict
diagnostic criteria as proposed by Mc Millen et al (2000) is not known. For example,
in Czarnocka and Slade's (2000) sample some patients did not meet all the three
symptoms characteristic of PTSD, but presented with a number of symptoms in the
PTSD sub-scales, 37 patients reported clinically significant frequency of intrusions,
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72 clinically significant levels of hyperarousal and 19 avoidance and numbing
symptoms.
Mayou and Smith (1997) also argue that dental phobics may present with trauma-
related symptoms, as these patients are known to exhibit avoidance of the dental
setting. Dental anxiety is also known to be frequently, based on past memories of
distressing dental events or experiences of pain (Mazey & Mito, 1993). Muris et al
(1998) reported that individuals with dental phobia reported higher levels of intrusive
thinking regarding past dental experiences and attempts to suppress negative
thoughts regarding dentist-related cognitions compared to a group of non-dental
phobics. However it is not known if these memories present as post-traumatic
symptomatology (frequent recurrent memories, suppression of memories and
increased arousal). De Jongh, et al (1995c) and Locker et al (1999) clearly
established a relationship between perceived trauma and dental anxiety (painful
treatment or treatment associated with terror). However only one study as far as the
author is aware has been carried out examining the relationship between dental
anxiety and trauma-related symptoms.
De Jongh et al (manuscript submitted for publication) carried out a study to
investigate the extent to which anxious dental patients displayed trauma-related
symptomatology (intrusive memories and tendency to avoid these memories)
associated with past dental events. The study compared two samples of patients, one
group consisted of dentally anxious patients (n 37) and the other group were regular
non-anxious dental patients (n 32).
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De Jongh et al (manuscript submitted for publication) found that thirty-two patients
in the patient group and twenty-four regular patients reported past unpleasant direct
dental experiences. However the main difference between the groups appeared to be
that the dentally anxious patients suffered intrusive memories of these experiences.
Twenty-eight patients reported intrusive memories of these events when visiting a
dentist. Half of the anxious patient group's IES scores were found to be indicative of
a clinically significant level of trauma-related symptomatology, greater than 26
which has been reported to be a significant level of trauma-related symptomatology
(Kleber, Brom & Defares, 1992). Six anxious patients were found to have 1ES
scores above 44, which was the average score for individuals who had experienced a
traumatic event in Horowitz et al's (1979) study (De Jongh et al, manuscript
submitted for publication). Both intrusion and avoidance scores were found to be
correlated. Dental anxiety and trauma-related symptomatology (intrusions and
avoidance) were found to have a strong direct relationship. De Jongh et al
(manuscript submitted for publication) concluded that post traumatic phenomenon
are of considerable importance amongst this population, with regard to the
understanding of the dynamics of anxiety about potentially aversive dental
procedures and the influence that this has on avoidance behaviour, which may
compromise the health and well-being of the patient.
Although the Impact of Event Scale (IES) is associated with scores on measures of
PTSD (Foa, Riggs, Dancu & Rothbaum, 1993) it has no arousal measure and is not a
diagnostic scale for PTSD. De Jongh et al (manuscript submitted for publication)
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therefore were unable to conclude what proportion of their intrusive memory sample
would have met a diagnosis of PTSD. They also only investigated direct dental
experiences and did not consider the indirect pathways of fear acquisition, which has
also been shown to be influential in dental fear acquisition (Milgrom et al, 1995;
Townend et al, 2000). DSM-iV diagnosis for PTSD does include that the person may
have witnessed a traumatic event as well as directly experiencing the event. It is
possible therefore that the indirect pathway to dental fear may also be implicated in
the dynamics of intrusive memories amongst this population.
Further De Jongh et al's (manuscript submitted for publication) research was carried
out in a specialised centre for dentistry and psychotrauma. Therefore it is not known
if their findings would generalise from a specialised centre to patients attending a
National Health Service secondary care clinic, set up for undergraduate dental
teaching.
At present in Scotland, a lack of data about dentally anxious patients and the lack of
understanding, about the psychology of anxiety has been identified (National Dental
Advisory Committee, 1998). Recently the General Dental Council and the British
Dental Association have requested that the dental profession find alternatives to the
current management of anxiety using General Anaesthesia. Undergraduate dental
students are also taught assessment and behavioural management of dental anxiety. It
is important therefore, that patients who may present with trauma-related
symptomatology are properly identified.
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If dentally anxious patients do present with PTSD or trauma-related symptomatology
then recognition of these symptoms may lead to a better understanding of the fear
beliefs of these patients, which would further contribute to more appropriate
treatment interventions.
De Jongh, et al (1995c) found that individuals with dental anxiety presented with
specific thought content resembling thoughts held by patients with other
psychological difficulties. Individuals with dental anxiety were found to display a
higher frequency of negative thoughts related to dentistry compared to a non-dentally
anxious group. It is not known if the dentally anxious patients in de Jongh et al's
(1995) study experienced intrusive memories of their past dental experiences.
Therefore it is not known if patients who identify intrusive memories of past
distressing dental experiences will differ in their frequency of thought content from
patients who do not identify intrusive memories. Identifying negative beliefs held, by
these patients would appear to be important for cognitive restructuring and
modification of these beliefs.
As has also been reported from the literature, patients presenting with dental fears
may also have other psychological difficulties (Aartman, 2000, Roy-Byrne et al,
1994). Again it is not known if patients presenting with intrusive memories of past
dental experiences will present with greater psychological difficulties that patients
without intrusive memories of past dental events.
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The aims of this study are to
1) To investigate the association between intrusive memories of past distressing
dental and or medical events and trauma-related symptomatology.
2) To investigate if a difference exists in dental anxiety level between participants
reporting intrusive memories of past dental and or medical events and
participants who do not report intrusive memories of such events.
3) To investigate if a difference exists in thought content related to dental care
between participants reporting intrusive memories of past dental and or medical
events and participants who do not report intrusive memories of such events.
4) To investigate if a difference exists in general psychopathology between
participants reporting intrusive memories of past dental and or medical events
and participants who do not report intrusive memories of such events.
5) To investigate the proportion of participants with intrusive memories who would
meet DSM-IV criteria for PTSD.
Hypotheses:
1) Intrusive memories of past distressing dental /and or medical events will be
associated with trauma-related symptomatology.
2) Participants who identity intrusive memories of past distressing dental and or
medical events will present with higher dental anxiety levels as measured by the
MDAS than those participants who do not identify such intrusive memories
3) Participants who identify intrusive memories of past distressing dental and or
medical events will present with higher levels of frequency of thought content
related to dental care as measured by the Dental Cognitions Checklist than those
participants who do not identify such intrusive memories.
4) Participants who identify intrusive memories of past distressing dental and or
medical events will present with higher levels of general psychopathology as
measured by the Brief Symptom Inventory (global indices) than those
participants who do not identify such intrusive memories.
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Chapter 6: Study 2 Intrusive Memories and Trauma-Related Symptoms and the
Differences between Individuals with and without Intrusive Memories on
Measures of Dental Anxiety, General Psychopatholosv and Beliefs Related to
Dental Care.
Method
6.1 Design: A correlational design was used to investigate the association between
intrusive memories of past distressing dental and or medical experiences and trauma-
related symptoms and a between subjects design was used to investigate the
differences between individuals with and without intrusive memories on measures of
general psychopathology and frequency of dentally related cognitions.
6.2 Sample: Adult patients who were attending the Dundee Dental Hospital Anxiety
Clinic during the clinic period (October 2000- May 2001) were invited to participate
in the study. In addition adult patients who had attended the Dundee Dental Anxiety
Clinic, but who had been assessed during previous clinic periods were also contacted
and invited to participate in the study. Patients were referred to the anxiety clinic
from both hospital and community dental surgeons. Ethical approval was obtained
for the study in November 2000 from Tayside Committee on Medical Research
Ethics. Data collection commenced during December 2000 following this approval.
Interviews and data collection were carried out by the author. Thirty-six participants
were recruited for the study.
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The number of appointments sent out for the October to May (2000-01) clinic, was
twenty-four, eight patients did not attend for their first or second appointments and
five cancelled and did not want a second appointment sent. Of the eleven patients
left, nine agreed to take part in the study. Seventy-nine letters were sent out in
January 2001 to patients who had attended the dental anxiety clinic but who had been
assessed during previous assessment clinics. The number of positive returns was
twenty-nine, five replied indicating they did not want to take part in the study. Nine
letters were returned, due to wrong addresses. Thirty-nine patients (thirty-five
females and four males) did not return the letters. In total there was a 36 per cent
response rate. Of the twenty-four patients who agreed to take part in the study, one
did not turn up for their first appointment, nor did they attend following a second
appointment being arranged. Two were excluded due to not reaching the inclusion
criteria.
Patients being seen at the IV sedation clinic (only one session was held during the
Oct-May session) were also approached and invited to participate in the study. Five
out of six patients did not attend for their appointments. One did turn up and agreed
to take part in the study but later declined due to health reasons.
As the sample number was low in March 2001 the inclusion criteria were relaxed to
include participants who reported a fear of the dentist but who were not attending the
dental school anxiety clinic. Participants were recruited through opportunistic
sampling. This involved giving information (written and oral) to participants, who
heard about the study through discussion with the author. Participants were recruited
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from hospital out-patients clinic staff (nursing and administration), community
nursing staff and university lecturing staff. Four participants were recruited, however
one was excluded due to not reaching the inclusion criteria. One patient was
recruited from the Tayside Clinical Psychology Department. This patient had been
referred due to severe dental anxiety, but was not referred to the dental school
anxiety clinic. Three patients were referred to the author from the pain clinic at
Ninewells Hospital, with dental anxiety. One patient was excluded due to not
reaching the inclusion criteria.
Permission was also gained from the dental clinic co-ordinator to run one extra
anxiety clinic assessment session (June 2001). Five patients were sent appointments
to attend for this session. All five patients failed to attend.
Inclusion Criteria: Participants who were aged 16 years and over who have a MDAS
score of 19 or greater. Participants were required to have sufficient English to
complete the interview and questionnaires.
Exclusion Criteria: Participants who did not meet MDAS criteria for dental anxiety.
Participants unable to complete the interview and questionnaires due to language
difficulties.
6,3 Sample Size: the sample size is based upon data from de Jongh et al (manuscript
submitted for publication). Using means and standard deviations from the Dental
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Anxiety Scale from a group of dentally anxious patients with intrusive memories of
past distressing dental experiences and a control group without dental anxiety or
intrusive memories of past distressing dental experiences. A sample size of 20 per
group would allow detection of an effect size of 0.8 at a .05 and a power of .80.
6,4 Measures:
The Modified Dental Anxiety Scale (MDAS) (Humpris, Morrison & Lindsay, 1995).
See page forty-five for the description of this measure (used in study one). In the
current study the Cronbach alpha coefficient was .48.
Dental Cognitions Questionnaire (DCQ) (de Jongh, Muris, Schoenmakers & Ter
Horst, 1995). This is a self-report measure containing 38-items which assesses
frequency and believability of negative cognitions related to dental treatment. It was
reported that the DCQ appeared to possess sufficient internal consistency,
Cronbach's alpha (frequency, 0.89 and believability 0.95) and high test-retest
reliability (0.83).
This measure has not been validated for the British population. However at present a
questionnaire assessing frequency of thoughts that individual's hold related to dental
care is used by staff at the Dundee Dental School anxiety clinic. The Dental
Cognitions Checklist (DCC) (Appendix 5) was devised by Milgrom et al (1985).
This version contains 40 items. The individual is asked to indicate the degree to
which each statement relates to their belief about dental care. There are an extra two
blank spaces for the patient to write down any anxiety provoking or disturbing
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thoughts that they might have related to dentistry. Thirty-five statements are related
to negative consequences of treatment, with five statements being related to
embarrassment about behaviour during treatment (no levels of agreement, regarding
the categories in this measure has been undertaken). This version of the DCC has not
been psychometrically evaluated but is used in the clinical setting to elicit primary
anxiety focussed cognitions. Likert scoring is used for this measure (questions 1-40).
The applied scoring was 0 = not at all, 1 = rarely, 2 = sometimes and 3 = often. Total
scores were calculated for each subject, with higher scores indicating a greater
frequency of negative beliefs regarding dental care.
The Impact ofEvent Scale (IES). (Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez, 1979). This is a self-
report instrument, which evaluates trauma-related intrusions and avoidance.
Respondents are asked to rate each IES symptom item on a four-point scale marked 0
(not at all), 1 (rarely), 3 (sometimes), 5 (often). Seven items evaluate intrusion and
eight evaluate avoidance. A scale score is computed by adding all 15 responses, thus
the scale score can range from 0-75. The IES has been shown to discriminate
between traumatised and nontraumatised groups (Bryant & Harvey, 1996). Horowitz
et al (1979) demonstrated internal reliability of alpha 0.79 for the intrusion subscale
and 0.82 for the avoidance subscale. A correlation of 0.42 was found between the
intrusion and avoidance sub-scales, indicating that the two subsets are associated but
do not measure identical dimensions. The IES was developed as a research tool and
Briere (1998) suggests that it should be used only as a screen for the presence of non-
arousal symptoms of PTSD. In the current study the Cronbach alpha coefficient was
.60.
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Structured Interview for PTSD (SIP) (Appendix 6) (Davidson, Smith & Kudler,
1989). The scale comprises 17 items reflective of the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD.
Each item is rated on a 0-4 scale and represents a composite of frequency, severity
and functional impairment (Davidson, Malik & Travers, 1997). There is a maximum
score of 68. The SIP serves as a symptom severity instrument and as a diagnostic
tool (Davidson et al, 1989). The diagnosis of PTSD is defined by DSM-IV criteria
including the experience of a traumatic event and the reaction to that event (fear,
helplessness or horror) plus:
♦ at least one item from category B/reexperiencing of the traumatic event with a
SIPS score of at least 2
♦ at least three items from category C/avoidance of stimuli associated with the
trauma and numbing of general responsiveness with a SIPS score of at least 2 (at
least one item must be from the avoidance category and one must be from the
numbing category)
♦ at least two items from category C/increased arousal with a SIPS score of at least
2.
Davidson et al (1997) demonstrated internal consistency of the scale, Cronbach alpha
of 0.80, concurrent validity with regards to the Davidson Trauma Scale, the Pearson
correlation coefficient was 0.67. In the current study the Cronbach alpha coefficient
was .73.
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Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) (Derogatis, 1993). The BSI is a 53-item self-report
symptom inventory which was designed to reflect the psychological symptoms of
psychiatric and medical patients as well as community non-patient respondents. It is
the brief form of the SCL-90-R. Each item of the BSI is rated on a five-point scale of
distress (0-4) ranging from "not at all" (0) to "extremely" (4). The BSI is scored and
profiled in terms of nine primary symptom dimensions and three global indices of
distress (Derogatis, 1993). The primary symptom dimensions are: Somatization,
Obsessive-Compulsive, Interpersonal Sensitivity, Depression, Anxiety, Hostility,
Phobic Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, Psychoticism. The three global indices provide a
more flexible overall assessment of the patient's psychopathological status. The three
global indices are: Global Severity Index (GSI), Positive Symptom Total (PST),
Positive Symptom Distress Index (PSDI). Internal consistency of the BSI is reported
as .71 (Cronbachs alpha). Test-retest reliability has been reported between .68
(somatization) to .91 (phobic anxiety). In the current study the Cronbach alpha
coefficient was .91.
Life-Events Checklist: this checklist forms part of the Clinician-Administered PTSD
Scale (CAPS-1). This was used to assess the number of past life events that each
participant may have experienced witnessed or learnt about.
The identification of distressing dental/medical incidents is based on de Jongh,
Aartman & Brand (manuscript submitted for publication) four-item questionnaire.
This was designed to assess traumatic incidents relating to dental treatment.
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Participants are asked the following questions:
1) Have you ever experienced or been told about or seen someone experience a
distressing event during dental or medical treatment that would explain your
dental anxiety?
2) What is the worst dental or medical event you can remember experiencing, been
told about or witnessing?
3) How many years ago did this happen?
4) Do memories of this incident come up when you visit a dentist?
6.5 Procedure: Adult patients who were attending the dental anxiety clinic were
invited to participate in the study. Newly referred patients were approached by the
author following their assessment (during the assessment session clinic with either
the clinical psychologist/or dental surgeon) and given information about the study.
An information sheet was provided (Appendix 7) describing the rationale of the
study. Patients who received the information sheet were contacted one week later (as
per ethical committee protocol) and those who agreed to take part in the study were
given an appointment to attend at Ninewells Hospital and Medical School, Dundee.
Patients who were attending for treatment (but not attending the assessment clinic)
were sent letters describing the rationale of the study. This group of participants were
asked to indicate whether they agreed to take part in the study and if agreeable to
note a point of contact (phone or further appointment letter). A SAE was included for
patients to return this information.
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Research interviews were carried out at Ninewells Hospital and Medical School, due
to renovation of the dental anxiety clinic premises (dental assessment and treatment
were carried out at another location within the dental hospital, however there was no
suitable location for the research interview to take place). A £10.00 travel expense
was paid to each participant.
The groups for this study were formed by the following procedure. Participants who
attended for interview and who identified distressing experiences (direct/indirect)
and who reported memories of the incident when visiting a dentist as identified by
De Jongh et al's (manuscript submitted for publication) four part questionnaire,
(question four) were asked to think about the worst event identified and the trauma
questionnaires (IES & SIPS) were administered related to this event. They were also
administered the MDAS, DCC and BSI.
Participants without intrusive memories as measured by De Jongh et al's (manuscript
submitted for publication) four part questionnaire (question four) were administered
the MDAS, DCC, and BSI the PTSD scales were omitted.
The time taken for each full interview (all measures) was found to be just over one
hour and twenty minutes.
6,6 Analyses: Analysis was carried out using the Statistical Package for Social
Sciences/ Windows (SPSS 10). Access to data was password protected. Exploratory
data analysis was used to determine the level of normality relating to distribution of
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measured variables. A Pearson-Moment Correlation was used to test for associations
between variables and to test hypothesis 1. An independent-samples t-test was used
to determine differences between groups and test hypothesis 2, 3 and 4.
128
Chapter 7: Results: Study 2 Intrusive Memories and Trauma-Related Symptoms
and the differences between Individuals with and without Intrusive Memories on
Measures of Dental Anxiety, General Psychopatholosv and Beliefs Related to
Dental Care.
As for study 1 the data set was checked for errors prior to analysis. No out-of-range
values were found for any of the variables. Exploratory data analysis was performed
to provide information concerning the distribution of scores on continuous variables




Data was analysed from thirty-six participants, five males and thirty-one females.
The mean age of the total sample was 39.17 years (SD 12.64, minimum 18-
maximum 77 years). Thirty-five participants identified a distressing past dental event
(no distressing medical procedures were identified) which they felt explained their
present dental anxiety.
Thirty-two participants identified a direct conditioning experience and three
participants identified an indirect conditioning experience. One participant could not
recall any direct or indirect distressing experiences and reported that she had always
been dentally anxious.
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When asked to recall the worst distressing dental event, fourteen participants (12
participants from the dental school, one participant referred to the author from
clinical psychology and one participant from the opportunistic sampling group)
reported that memories of that event came into their mind when visiting a dentist.
Three of the twelve participants from the dental anxiety clinic had attended during
the October 2000-May 2001 session. Nine had been assessed prior to this session.
Twelve participants of this group reported past direct conditioning experiences and
two participants reported an indirect conditioning experience.
Of the fourteen participants in the intrusive memory group, eleven reported direct
experiences which involved painful dental procedures. Two of this group reported
that as well as painful experiences the dentist had been abrupt, and one reported that
the dentist had held her down in the chair. The other directly conditioned participant
reported an incident, which for reasons of confidentiality can not be recorded here
(although the participant did agree that their data could be used in the study).
The two indirect participants in this group reported one family member becoming
unwell following a dental procedure, which required hospitalisation (witnessed). The
other participant reported the death of a family member following a dental procedure
(transmission of information).
Twenty participants in the no intrusive memory group reported direct conditioning
experiences, one reported an indirect experience and one could not recall a pathway
of conditioning. The directly conditioned participants all reported incidents of painful
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treatment. One recalled being told that they were just having a dental assessment
then having a painful tooth extraction. Following this episode, mistrust of dentists
developed. The indirect participant reported being told by a sibling that dental
treatment was extremely painful, and from that point, the participant has experienced
anticipatory anxiety regarding painful treatment.
Table 7. presents demographic details of the two groups (intrusive memories and no
intrusive memories) for mean age, mean age at trauma and dental avoidance history.
Table 7, Mean age, age at trauma and dental avoidance history for the Intrusive
memory and Non-Intrusive memory groups.
MEM AGE AGETRAUM AVOIDHIS
Intrusive
N (14) Mean 40.57 14.07 13.36
(SD) (12.63) (7.59) (7.63)
Nonintrusive
N (22) Mean 38.27 15.86 15.00
(SD) (13.11) (9.38) (8.16)
An Independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the ages of the two groups
(t(34)=.520, p =.606, two-tailed) the age when trauma occurred (t(34) =.269,p = .790,
two-tailed) and avoidance history (t(34) =.600, p=.552, two-tailed). No statistical
differences were found between the two groups for either age, age when trauma
occurred or years of avoidance.
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For the intrusive memory group the mean number of years since their worst dental
experience was 25 years (SD 15.34).
There were no differences in the number of life events that participants had
experienced, witnessed or learnt about between the groups.
Data analysis was performed to assess whether the sample data conformed to a
normal distribution. Visual inspection of the distribution of scores was carried out
and a formal statistical analysis was performed. The results of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic for the memory group are presented in table 8.










*IESAV Avoidance subscale of the IES *IESINT Intrusion subscale of the IES
*IESTOT Total IES *SIPAV Avoidance subscale of the SIP *SIPINT Intrusion
subscale of the SIP *SfPHYP Increased Arousal subscale of the SIP *SIPTOT Total
SIP
The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics for both groups is presented in
table 9.
Table 9. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality, General measures
MEM Measures df Sig











*MDAS Modified Dental Anxiety Scale *DCC Dental Cognitions Checklist
* BSIGLOB Brief Symptom Inventory global score * PST Brief Symptom Inventory
Positive Symptom Total * PSDI Brief Symptom Inventory Positive Symptom
Distress Index
The results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic were found to be non-significant
indicating that the assumption of normality has not been violated. Parametric tests
were applied for the analysis.
A comparison was also made between the participants who took part in the study and
those who did not return their letters. The five individuals who returned their letters
but who did not agree to take part were also included in this group, as was the
respondent who failed to turn up for both appointments after agreeing to take part in
the study.
Table 10. Comparison ofmean scores for age and dental anxiety level for responders
and non-responders.
GROUP MDAS AGE
Ressample Mean 22.26 39.33
N (36) SD (1.88) (12.64)
Nonparticipants Mean 21.56 34.36
N (45) SD (2.86) (11.77)
• ressample (sample who took part in study two)
• nonparticipants (sample who either did not return their letters or who declined to
take part in the study)
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An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the ages (t(79) = 1.208, p =
.071, two-tailed) and the level of dental anxiety (t(79) = 1.208, p = .231, two-tailed).
No significant differences were found between the two groups.
Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis one predicted that intrusive memories of past distressing dental and or
medical events will be associated with trauma-related symptomatology. The mean
scores for the trauma-related measures are presented in Table 11
Table 11. Mean scores for trauma measures, intrusive memory group (N14)
IES1NT IESAV 1ESTOT SIPINT SIPAV SIPHYP SIPTOT
Mean 19.50 17.71 37.21 7.21 4.79 5.21 15.86
SD (9.09) (8.29) (14.75) (4.19) (3.51) (3.14) (10.17)
Correlation analysis was performed to describe the strength of the relationship
between intrusive memories using the IES intrusive memory scale and the other
measures of trauma-related symptoms. Prior to analysis scatterplots were generated
to check for violation of the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity (appendix
8). Visual inspection of the scatterplots showed that these assumptions had not been
violated.
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Pearson product-moment correlation was carried out for the analysis. The strength of
the relationship was based on Cohen's (1988) guidelines (r =.10 to .29= small, r =
.30 to .49 = medium, r = 50 to 1.0 = large).
Table 12. Pearson-Product - Moment Correlations between IES (intrusion scale) and
IES (avoidance), SIPS (intrusion, avoidance, increased arousal and total SIP scale)
Measure IES intrusion Coefficient of determination
r2xl00
IES avoidance .44 p=. 115 19%
SIP intrusion .50 p=.065 25%
SIP avoidance .40 p=. 155 16%
SIP increased arousal .41 p=.139 16%
SIP total .56 p=.035* 31%
*
p <.05 (two-tailed)
There was a medium positive correlation between intrusive memories (as measured
by the IES intrusion subscale) and avoidance (as measured by the IES avoidance
subscale), this was not found to be statistically significant. There was a large positive
correlation between intrusive memories as measured by the IES and SIP intrusive
memory scales, this was not found to be statistically significant. There was a medium
positive correlation between intrusive memories (as measured by the IES intrusion
subscale) and avoidance (as measured by the SIP avoidance subscale), this was not
found to be statistically significant. There was a medium positive correlation
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between intrusive memories (as measured by the IES intrusion subscale) and
increased arousal (as measured by the SIP increased arousal subscale), this was not
found to be statistically significant. There was a large positive correlation between
intrusive memories (as measured by the IES intrusion subscale) and total SIP score.
This was found to be statistically significant, with frequency of intrusive memories
being associated with frequency and severity of intrusive memories, avoidance of
stimuli associated with the trauma and increased arousal (as measured by the SIP).
The shared variance between intrusive memories (intrusive memory subscale of the
IES) and avoidance (IES), intrusion (SIP), avoidance (SIP), increased arousal (SIP)
and total SIP can all be accounted for by less than 50 per cent. This indicates that
over 50 per cent of the variance in intrusive memories, avoidance, increased arousal
and total SIP is due to other variables other than intrusive memories related to the
trauma.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis two predicted that participants who identified intrusive memories of past
distressing dental events will report higher levels of dental anxiety than those
participants who did not identify such intrusive memories.
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare levels of dental anxiety
between the two groups. Table 13 presents the mean scores for dental anxiety and
Independent-samples t-test between the two groups.
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Tablel3. Mean MDAS scores intrusive memory and non-intrusive memory group
and Independent-samples t-test MDAS between the two groups.
Group N Mean (SD) df t Sig (1-tailed) 95% CI
lower upper
Intrusive 14 22.57 (2.21) 34 .959 .172 -.69 1.92
Nonintru 22 21.95 (1.65)
* Nonintru (non-intrusive memory group)
There was no statistically significant difference found for level of dental anxiety
between the two groups, (t(34)=.959, p = .172, one-tailed).
Hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis three predicted that participants who identify intrusive memories of past
distressing dental and or medical events will present with higher levels of frequency
of thought content related to dental care than those participants who do not identify
such memories. Table 14 presents the mean DCC total for both groups and
independent-samples t-test between the two groups.
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Table 14. Mean DCC scores intrusive and non-intrusive memory groups and
Independent-samples t-test DCC between the two groups
Group N Mean (SD) df t Sig (1-tailed) 95% CI
lower upper
Intrusive 14 57.93 (20.57) 34 .069 .473 -16.10 15.05
Nonintru 22 58.45 (23.48)
* Nonintru (non-intrusive memory group)
There was no statistically significant difference found for frequency of thought
content related to dental care between the two groups, (t(34) =069,p = .473, one-
tailed)
Hypothesis 4:
Hypothesis four predicted that participants who identify intrusive memories of past
distressing dental and or medical events will present with higher levels of general
psychopathology than those participants who do not identify such intrusive
memories. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare levels of
general psychopathology (BSIGLOB) between the two groups.
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Table 15 presents the mean scores for BSIGLOB and independent-samples t-test
between the two groups.
Table 15. Mean BSIGLOB scores intrusive and non-intrusive memory groups and
Independent-samples t-test BSIGLOB between the two groups
Group N Mean (SD) df t Sig (1-tailed) 95% CI
lower upper
Intrusive 14 1.07 (.75) 34 .356 .362 -.39 .56
Nonintru 22 .99 (.64)
* Nonintru (non-intrusive memory group)
There was no statistically significant difference found for global level of general
psychopathology between the two groups, (t (34) = .356, p = .362, one-tailed)
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare levels of general
psychopathology (BSIPST) between the two groups.
Table 16 presents the mean scores for BSIPST and independent-samples t-test
between the two groups.
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Table 16. Mean BSIPST scores intrusive and non-intrusive memory groups and
Independent-samples t-test BSIPST between the two groups
Group N Mean (SD) df t Sig (1-tailed) 95% CI
lower upper
Intrusive 14 32.21 (9.07) 34 1.766 .073 Ci -j !* h-■» oto
Nonintru 22 27.09 (8.11)
* Nonintru (non-intrusive memory group)
There was no statistical difference found for levels on the BSIPST between the two
groups, (t (34)=1.766, p =.073, one-tailed)
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare levels of general
psychopathology (BSIPSDI) between the two groups.
Table 17 presents the mean scores for BSIPSDI and independent-samples t-test
between the two groups.
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Table 17. Mean BSIPSDI scores intrusive and non-intrusive memory groups and
Independent-samples t-test BSIPSDI between the two groups
Group N Mean (SD) df t Sig (1-tailed) 95% CI
lower upper
Intrusive 14 1.80 (.87) 34 .418 .339 -.44 .67
Nonintru 22 1.69 (.76)
There was no statistical difference found for BSIPSDI scores between the two
groups, (t (34) =.418, p = .339, one-tailed).
The fifth aim of this study was to investigate the proportion of participants presenting
with intrusive memories who would meet DSM-IV criteria for PTSD. This was based
on SIPS DSM-IV criteria. Only one participant from the intrusive memory group met
the DSM-IV criteria, with symptoms lasting over a four-week period (more than 30
days). This participant was actively avoiding attending the dental anxiety clinic.
One participant reported increased arousal, intrusive memories and avoidance lasting
for over two weeks. This participant was engaged in dental treatment at the time of
the research interview, and although attended for treatment, reported that when away
from the dental school, actively attempted to avoid thoughts or feelings regarding her
planned treatment.
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The remaining participants reported that their symptoms had been more frequent
during the days approaching the interview.
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Chapter 8: Discussion Study 2. Intrusive Memories and Trauma-Related
Symptoms and the differences between Individuals with and without Intrusive
Memories on Measures ofDental Anxiety, General Psychopathology and Beliefs
Related to Dental Care
8.1 Summary ofResearch:
De Jongh et al (manuscript submitted for publication) reported that intrusive
memories of past distressing dental experiences were associated with trauma-related
symptomatology and level of dental anxiety. This was carried out in a specialised
centre for dentistry and trauma, therefore it was unknown if these findings would
generalise to other populations. It was also unknown how many patients presenting
with intrusive memories would meet DSM-IV criteria for PTSD. De Jongh et al
(1995a) also proposed that cognitive factors might influence, maintain or exacerbate
dental anxiety. Further it is also recognised that individuals with dental anxiety may
have additional psychological difficulties, which may lead to difficulties in treatment
(Aartman, 2000).
It was not known if intrusive memories of past distressing dental and or medical
experiences would influence degree of general psychopathology or thought content
related to dental care.
Study two was conducted to investigate the association between intrusive memories
of past distressing dental and or medical events and trauma-related symptomatology
in participants with dental anxiety. The proportion of individuals meeting DSM-IV
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diagnostic criteria for PTSD was also investigated. In addition a further investigation
was carried out to assess if differences existed between participants identifying
intrusive memories and those without intrusive memories on measures of dental
anxiety, frequency of thought content related to dental care and general
psychopathology.
8,2 Discussion of Research Findings:
Based on IES mean scores this study appears to show that participants who present
with intrusive memories related to past distressing dental events do have significant
trauma-related difficulties.
Ten of the participants were found to have mean IES scores above 26. According to
De Jongh et al (manuscript submitted for publication) this is indicative of a clinically
significant level of trauma-related symptomatology. Three of these participants had
mean IES scores greater than 44. De Jongh et al (manuscript submitted for
publication) reported that over half of their sample scored above the cut-off point of
26 on the IES. The findings from both studies suggest that participants who identify
intrusive memories of past distressing dental experiences present with significant
trauma-related distress where this is assessed by the IES. Briere (1998) however
cautions using the IES as no more than a screening tool for the presence of non-
arousal-related post-traumatic stress. Caution is required therefore for using it for
diagnostic purposes.
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One patient was identified with DSM-IV criteria for PTSD using SIPS DSM-IV
criteria. This participant reported that the disturbance caused significant distress in
both social and occupational functioning.
Results from the correlational analysis found a medium positive correlation between
intrusive memories and avoidance (using both the IBS and SIPS) however no
statistical significance was found. A medium positive correlation was found between
intrusive memories and increased arousal, no statistical significance was found. A
large positive correlation was found between the IES intrusion subscale and the SIPS
intrusion scale however no statistical significance was found. A large positive
correlation was also found between the IES intrusion subscale and the total SIPS
score, this was found to be statistically significant. This suggests a strong
relationship between frequency of intrusive memories of past distressing dental
events and frequency and severity of trauma-related symptoms as measured by a
scale reflective of DSM-IV criteria. This supports the hypothesis that individuals
reporting intrusive memories of past distressing dental events present with trauma-
related symptoms. De Jongh et al (manuscript submitted for publication) found a
large significant association between IES intrusions and IES avoidance. This was not
supported by this study.
The longitudinal study of accident victims with PTSD suggests a picture of intrusive
memories and heightened arousal many years following the trauma. The mean length
of time from worst dental event to assessment in this study was 25 years, suggesting
that trauma-related distress was still being identified in the intrusive memory group
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many years following the event. McFarlane and Papay (1992) found that eight years
after a disaster intrusive memories and symptoms of disordered arousal were still
prominent. However failure to reach threshold for avoidance and estrangement
represented the reasons as to why PTSD criteria were not met. It is possible this is
reflected in this study where only one participant met DSM-IV diagnostic criteria.
However the participants in the intrusive memory group did present with significant
trauma-related symptoms (reflected by their mean IES scores and the strong
association between IES intrusions and SIPS total score). This finding may offer
support for the proposal by Stein et al (1997) that individuals may present with
"partial PTSD" i.e. significant trauma-related distress without meeting full PTSD
diagnosis.
It was reported by a number of participants that intrusive memories and trauma-
related symptoms were triggered by the anticipation of discussing there past dental
experiences. This is also similar to the finding by Lautch (1971). He originally
reported that any reference to dentistry amongst a group of dental phobics produced
vivid images of the traumatic experience.
Although a large positive correlation was found between intrusive memories, and
total SIP score, the shared variance was found to be 31 per cent. Therefore more
than half of the variance between intrusive memories, and SIPS total score appears to
be due to other factors. Shalev (2001) argues that other factors may be involved in
predicting PTSD especially post-trauma factors. Post and pre-trauma factors (social-
support and further stressors) identified by Shalev (2001) are unknown in the
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intrusive memory group in this study. It is also unknown if the intrusive memory
group had experienced more distressing dental events than the non-intrusive memory
group. The dental history of the participants prior to their worst identified event was
not established in this study. This is a clear limitation, as previous trauma is known
to be a risk factor for the development of PTSD and is also known to exacerbate
reactions to current traumas.
There was no support for the hypotheses that intrusive memories would influence
levels of dental anxiety. Although mean levels of dental anxiety were found to be
higher in the intrusive memory group, there was no statistical difference found
between the two groups, suggesting that the intrusive memory group did not differ in
their levels of severity of dental anxiety. This does not support De Jongh et al's
(manuscript submitted for publication) findings. The data from this study suggest
that unless trauma-related symptoms are specifically assessed trauma-related
difficulties may be missed if using level of dental anxiety as an indicator of distress.
This has important implications for the assessment and treatment of individuals
presenting with dental anxiety and trauma-related dental distress. If trauma-related
symptoms are missed it may well preclude individuals from being given appropriate
clinical treatment
A partial explanation for the differences obtained between this current study and that
of De Jongh et al (manuscript submitted for publication) were differences in the
measures used to assess dental anxiety. De Jongh et al (manuscript submitted for
publication) used the CDAS for assessing dental anxiety. Humphris et al (1995)
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have criticised the use of the CDAS due to the order of the items on the scale, which
are believed to be confusing for the respondent. According to Humphris et al (1995)
answers reflecting "slightly anxious" may be assigned moderately high scores, with
the converse for moderate anxiety. The MDAS was used in this study in an attempt
to remove this confusion plus it is also routinely used at the dental anxiety clinic.
However of note was the low Cronbach coefficient alpha for this measure in this
study. As this was a short scale (less than six items) Briggs and Cheek (1986)
suggest that it may be more appropriate to assess the mean inter-item correlation for
the items, with the optimal range of correlation of .2 to .4. The range of correlations
for the MDAS in this study was found to be.O to .2. Thus possibly limiting its use in
this studies population and limiting any conclusions made from the results as to the
influence on intrusive memories and levels of dental anxiety.
No statistical differences were found between the two groups for levels of frequency
of thoughts regarding dental care. This suggests that the level of frequency of beliefs
regarding negative consequences of treatment and social embarrassment related to
dental care does not differ between the two groups. Muris et al (1998) found that a
group of dental phobic patients actively tried harder to suppress negative thoughts
regarding dentist-related cognitions and had higher levels of intrusive thinking
regarding dental treatment compared to a group of non-phobic participants.
No statistical differences were found between the groups for levels of general
psychopathology. McMillen et al (2000) found that avoidance and numbing PTSD
symptoms were associated with psychiatric comorbidity. The participants in this
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sample were found to endorse less avoidance and numbing symptoms of both
measures therefore this might reflect a less general psychologically distressed
intrusive memory group in this study.
The mean age of worst distressing dental event was found to differ between the two
groups. Although there was no statistical difference between the groups,
developmental stage at time of trauma is known to be an important factor for later
traumatic stress and its sequelae (Yule et al, 1999). Chapman and Kirby-Turner
(1999) suggest that appraisal of threat may be due to greater cognitive ability which
may be associated with later adolescence. Contrary to the findings in this study
where a mean younger age at time of worst experience was found. It is possible that
experiencing a distressing dental event with less cognitive ability for appraisal may
lead to more inappropriate levels of physiological arousal. Bryant et al (2000) and
Shalev et al (1998) have reported higher levels of physiological arousal (higher
heart-rates) amongst those who developed PTSD amongst adults, the processes
involved amongst children and adolescents is less clear. It is possible that differences
in physiological response to distressing events may be associated with stage of
development. Perry (1994) has proposed that differences exist in response to trauma
according to development level, with younger children dissociating at time of trauma
compared to older children responding with heightened arousal.
Mean years of avoidance were not found to differentiate between the two groups
although the non-intrusive memory group had a longer period of avoiding the dentist
than the intrusive memory group. However avoidance can occur at both the cognitive
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and behavioural levels including other activities that numb or distract. It is possible
that assessing only one strategy of avoidance (behavioural) does not adequately
target the number of potential avoidance strategies that may differ between these two
populations.
Direct conditioning experiences were found to be the pathway recalled by thirty-two
of the participants. Painful dental procedures were reportedly involved and identified
in all the direct cases as the negative precipitant that triggered fear of the dentist.
This finding is similar to previous research (Lautch, 1971, Locker at al, 1999).
However identification of the "worst dental experience" was based on retrospective
recall, which may be subject to memory and interpretation bias. A study by Kent
(1989) found that patients with dental anxiety reported more pain three months
following treatment than was reported directly after treatment. However Brewin,
Andrews and Gotlib (1993) argue that claims about the unreliability of retrospective
reports are exaggerated, citing evidence that retrospective accounts of onset
experiences have been confirmed when evidence is sought from others.
Two participants in the intrusive memory group identified indirect experiences
precipitating their dental anxiety. Although it is difficult to generalise from such a
small number, this study has identified that participants recalling indirect experiences
may also develop significant trauma-related difficulties. It is possible to argue that
the indirect experiences identified by these two participants could be viewed as
significant life-events, certainly fulfilling DSM-IV PTSD criteria A (1) and may not
reflect Rachman's (1968) proposal that indirect conditioning would be reflected by a
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lesser strength of response than direct conditioning. However as previous research
has shown (Ost and Hugdahl, 1981) and from the limited findings from study 1,
indirect pathways of conditioning may also involve responses similar or greater than
those acquired directly.
The actual numbers of participants in this study was low. Bennett and Brooke (1999)
have also reported a low sample rate in their study investigating PTSD. It is possible
that individuals who have more distressing symptoms may avoid a study, which is
asking participants to describe previous dental experiences. There was no statistical
difference between the participants who took part in the study and those who either
did not respond, respond in the negative or who did not turn up for arranged
appointments for either age or dental anxiety level. However as discussed above
trauma distress related to dental anxiety may be missed if this is dependent on a
measure of dental anxiety level alone.
8,3 Methodological Problems
There were methodological problems related to this study. The sample size was small
and therefore was insufficient to achieve adequate statistical power, based on the
sample size calculated from De Jongh et aTs (manuscript submitted for publication)
study. A retrospective power calculation was performed. A sample size of 60 per
group would allow detection of an effect size of 0.5 at a .05 and a power of .80.
The correlational analysis was also calculated on a small sample. Significance of r is
strongly influenced by the size of the sample. Therefore in a small sample moderate
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correlation's may not reach statistical significance at .05 level. Pallant (2001)
suggests that where sample size is < 30 then shared variance calculated by the
coefficient of determination between the two variables should be the focus.
The MDAS Cronbach alpha coefficient was found to be .4 for this study. It is
possible that this scale may be measuring something different to the scale as a whole.
Further research is obviously required to evaluate this scale especially as it is widely
used with this dentally anxious population.
The dental cognitions questionnaire (DCC) was used in this study to assess
frequency of beliefs regarding dental care. This questionnaire has not been subjected
to psychometric evaluation. No inter-rater agreement was carried out as to the items
included in the DCC for this study. Therefore any conclusions drawn from the results
of the DCC are severely limited. Neither reliability nor validity has been addressed
regarding this scale. However as beliefs regarding dentistry are believed to have
more explanatory power than a single measure of trait anxiety, it would be useful to
subject this measure to psychometric evaluation and to apply it not just as a scoring
measure (frequency) but also to evaluate the specific negative beliefs regarding
dental care.
Due to low numbers inclusion criteria were relaxed. Therefore including participants
from out-with the dental anxiety clinic may have led to a bias in the sample.
Specifically, it can be argued that the use of opportunistic sampling may have
introduced a respondent bias into the study. However only one participant from this
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group identified intrusive memories and therefore it is likely that this did not have
too great an effect on the final results. As the actual numbers of individuals with
dental anxiety is unknown, it is also possible that participants included from the
dental anxiety clinic are also a biased sample. As avoidance of dental care is known
to be one of the main presenting behaviours involved in dental anxiety, then it is
possible that the dental school sample represent a distinct group of dentally anxious
individuals. Either those who are pre-contemplating involvement in the treatment
process, or whose community dentists are unable to deliver appropriate management.
8,4 Study Limitations
In addition to the sample size and the methodological issues regarding study 2 a
number of limitations have been identified.
Previous trauma is known to be a risk factor for reactions to current traumas.
Although both groups were administered the Life Events checklist and no differences
were found between the groups, there was no measure used for previous reactions to
other traumas. It is unknown if participants in either group have trauma-related
difficulties related to other non-dental experiences. This factor may have a
consequence for any findings from this or any other similar study.
Briere (1998) has also reported underreporting of traumatic symptomatology. As
only the participants who reported intrusive memories were assessed with trauma-
related scales it is possible that some participants in the non-intrusive memory group
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may have trauma-related difficulties but were not identified due to avoidance of
reporting such symptoms.
De Silva and Marks (1999) argue that intrusive recollections can be thoughts or
images or both, with the evidence that images are more common than thoughts. They
point out that these two forms of intrusive recollections are often treated as one. They
argue that accurate assessment is important because the nature of the cognitive
experience may be important for treatment choice. The assessment use in this study
did not differentiate between thoughts or images and used the term "memories". This
may have limited the responses for some participants and would not accurately
differentiate the nature of the intrusions.
De Silva and Marks (1999) also argue that individuals may experience intrusive
cognitions that are not recollections of the traumatic event itself but as a consequence
of the trauma e.g. negative thoughts about the self, threat and danger and thoughts
about the meaning of the event. These intrusive collections according to de Silva and
Marks (1999) can be distressing for the individual. It is possible that these types of
cognitions do operate in this group related to dental procedures, however this was not
assessed.
8,5 Ethical Considerations
It is possible that participating in such a study may initiate discomfort and distress
for the participants especially when being asked to recall distressing experiences.
Parslow et al (2000) found that following an epidemiological survey of PTSD most
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participants reported short-term distress but no evidence of long-term harm. All
participants were fully briefed as to the rationale of the study (as per British
Psychological Society Guidelines). Only one participant indicated that this was the
first time that she had disclosed her past distressing experiences. She had not
reported it in previous dental anxiety assessments. This participant was offered a
referral to the clinical psychologist at the dental school, but she declined this offer.
8,6 Future Research
Despite the usefulness of the 1ES it is limited due to its exclusion of hyperarousal
symptoms. Recently Weiss et al (1995) revised the IES, leading to a new scale IES-R
that incorporates hyperarousal symptoms. The IES-R would be a useful instrument
for future research in this area due to its inclusion of hyperarousal symptoms. If
found to be a reliable measure of trauma-related symptoms in this population, it
would be a useful and easy to administer measure, which would allow essential
screening of this population.
It is presently unknown if these additional trauma-related difficulties will lead to
obstacles in implementing therapy related to dental anxiety. It is known however that
individuals with trauma-related symptoms can present with certain difficulties related
to treatment. Richards and Lovell (1999) note that difficulty engaging with treatment
is often found amongst individuals presenting with PTSD. Although only two
studies have found evidence for trauma-related symptoms amongst dentally anxious
individuals, future research should include treatment efficacy and outcome studies.
At present there are no authoritative guidelines available to inform clinical decision
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making in this area. The results of this study and that of de Jongh et al's suggest that
the influence of trauma-related difficulties in this population require further
elaboration.
At present it is not known what factors have contributed to some individuals
presenting with trauma-related symptoms related to past distressing dental
experiences. It would be useful to be able to predict which factors give rise to
trauma-related symptoms amongst dentally anxious individuals. This would allow
better utilisation of assessment and treatment methods. Both groups identified
mainly painful past dental experiences as the precipitant leading to their dental
anxiety. Pain however is a subjective process and experiences of pain, including
revaluation of the beliefs regarding pain are also subject to individual differences.
Pain is also known to be affected by cognitive maturation (McGrath, 1995). It is not
known if this would contribute to the age differences at distressing dental experience
observed in this study or not. Assessing cognitions related to painful dental
procedures may add to this debate.
It has been suggested in an earlier section that past traumatic experiences may have
led to the group differences. Future research should address this issue to investigate
if this has any influence on the development or maintenance of dental anxiety.
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8.7 Conclussions
Dental anxiety has been implicated as a major barrier to optimal health care yet a
lack of data regarding the psychology of dental anxiety has been identified in
Scotland.
Direct conditioning experiences are believed to be the most helpful in explaining the
acquisition of dental fears. However indirect pathways have also been investigated in
the aetiology of the disorder. Rachman (1968) proposed that fears acquired by direct
conditioning would lead to a greater strength of response than fears acquired
indirectly. He also proposed (Rachman, 1977) that different modes of onset may
provide data for appropriate treatment intervention. Results from study 1 although
limited due to the nature of the data collection do not support Rachman's (1968)
premise. Due to the methodological problems in study 1 any conclusions remain
tentative, however the results appear to suggest that dental anxiety acquired via
indirect pathways may lead to as great a response as those acquired directly.
Therefore treatment interventions should focus on the individuals beliefs regarding
their fears rather than primarily on route of fear acquisition.
Further to the lack of data regarding the dynamics of dental anxiety, this study has
identified trauma-related symptomatology in individuals presenting with dental fears.
This is the first study to identify the proportion of individuals with dental anxiety
who would meet diagnosis for PTSD. The initial findings suggest that dentally
anxious individuals do not suffer from PTSD but may present with intrusive
memories of past dental experiences that still cause distress when exposed to dentally
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related stimuli or reminders of their past distressing dental experiences. It is not
presently known if the failure to meet diagnosis for PTSD amongst this population is
due to the difficulty with PTSD diagnostic criteria or due to specific aspects of their
trauma.
The results of this study will hopefully lead to further research and debate especially
in the current climate of evidence-based practice. The findings of both this study and
that of de Jongh et al's require to be replicated as the results suggest that specific
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Name Date
CAN YOU TELL US HOW ANXIOUS/FEARFUL YOU GET, IF AT ALL, WHEN
YOU VISIT YOUR DENTIST?
Please indicate by inserting 'X' in the appropriate box
1. Ifyou went to your Dentist for TREATMENT TOMORROW, how would you
feel?
Not Slightly Fairly Very Extremely
Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □
2. Ifyou were sitting in the WAITING ROOM (waiting for your turn to see the
dentist), how would you feel?
Not Slightly Fairly Very Extremely
Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □
3. If you were about to have a TOOTH DRILLED, how would you feel?
Not Slightly Fairly Very Extremely
Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □
4. Ifyou were about to have your TEETH SCALED AND POLISHED, how would
you feel?
Not Slightly Fairly Very Extremely
Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □
5. If you were about to have a LOCAL ANAESTHETIC INJECTION in your gum,
above a upper back tooth, how would you feel?
Not Slightly Fairly Very Extremely
Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □ Anxious □
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Histogram ofMDAS Scores: Direct conditioning group
Histogram of MDAS Scores
CONDDIR: 1 direct
MDASTOT
Histogram ofMDAS Scores: Indirect conditioning group
Histogram of MDAS Scores
CONDDIR: 2 indirect
18.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 22.0 23.0 24.0 25.0
MDASTOT
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Histogram ofDFS Physiological Arousal Scores: Direct conditioning group
Histogram of DFS Physiological Arousal Scores
CONDDIR: 1 direct
10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0
DFSPHYS
Histogram ofDFS Physiological Arousal Scores: Indirect conditioning group
Histogram of DFS Physiological Arousal Scores
CONDDIR: 2 indirect
7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0
DFSPHYS
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AVOIDANCE STUDY 1
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Histogram ofDFS Behavioural Avoidance Scores: Direct conditioning group
Histogram of DFS Behavioural Avoidance Scores
CONDDIR: 1 direct
DFSAVOID
Histogram ofDFS Behavioural Avoidance Scores: Indirect conditioning group
Histogram of DFS Behavioural Avoidance Scores
CONDDIR: 2 indirect
2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0
DFSAVOID
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DCC
Each item below describes a thought that some patients think to
themselves about dental care. Please read each statement and indicate
the degree to which it applies to you now. I think that....
If statement does not apply fully to your




Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
1 the needle seems so long! Like it could
stick into my eye, nose or brain.
2 the needle might hit a nerve or something
and damage it.
3 nothing is as painful as a needle in my
mouth.
4 the needle might break off.
5 medical needles are much smaller and less
painful.
6 I'm very hard to get numb.
7 ifmy throat gets numb from an injection I
won't be able to breathe or swallow.
8 if I'm leaned back too far in the dental
chair I get claustrophobic.
9 when I'm in the dental chair I can't stop
for a rest
10 being in the dental chair can bring back
bad memories from other events in my life.
11 I can't breathe with instruments in my
mouth.
12 I can't swallow with instruments in my
mouth
13 I might get too much radiation from the x-
rays.
14 the mercury or other metals (or plastics)
might be dangerous to my health.
15 too much topical anaesthetic might make it
so I could not breathe or swallow.
16 I'm always waiting for the drill to hurt
17 I'm fearful that the dentist might slip and
injure me.





Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
19 I can't stand the sound ofhaving my teeth
cleaned (scraped).
20 I can't stand that burning smell when they
drill on teeth.
21 I'm allergic to something - like the local
anaesthetic agent, and it might harm me.
22 impressions (moulds and models) make me
feel like I can't swallow or breathe.
23 impressions (moulds and models) make me
feel like I will gag.
24 x-rays make me gag.
25 x-rays hurt.
26 I will have lots ofpain after treatment.
27 they will find something terrible wrong
with me.
28 I might be so scared and I will do
something embarrassing.
29 it is so embarrassing to be fearful, I might
not go ahead with treatment.
30 I get anxious before a dental appointment.
31 I am emotionally exhausted after an
appointment.
32 I am physically exhausted after an
appointment.
33 I can't stand the sight or taste ofblood
34 they might drill too deep.
35 the dentist is going to say I need a root
canal.
DCC
I think that......... Don't
Know
Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
37 the numbness will not go away.
38 the dentist will think I'm foolish or
childish.
39 I feel so guilty about letting things go, I
don't deserve treatment.
40 I'm so fearful that I'm too much trouble to
treat.
Did we miss any? Please write down any
anxiety provoking or disturbing thoughts
you might have relating to dental care.
41
42
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tials ID# Date Visit # Age Sex Race
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FOR
PTSD (SIP)
roduction [If this is the first encounter with subject]
I should like to ask about the difficulties or problems that caused you to come for help.
First would you please tell me your age: Where do you live?
Are you employed? If yes: What is your job?
If no: When did you last work?
What did you do? Why did you stop work?
With whom do you live?
Please tell me about your family, friends, and social activities.
Experience of Trauma
Did you ever experience, witness or have to confront an extremely stressful event which involved actual or
atened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of yourself or others?
No Yes
Did you react to the event(s) with intense fear, helplessness or horror?
No Yes
How long were you in that situation? What was the worst thing about it for you?
Define the event(s). Identify by numbers below. Narrative comment may be added.
Event Age at Event
I 1 = Combat
12 = Rape
3 = Incest
4 = Other physical assault/attack
5 = Seeing someone killed or hurt
6 = Natural disaster
7 = Accident
8 = Complicated bereavement
9 = Threat of close call
10 = Life threatening illness
11= Other (identify)
1
A4 Identify which event was the worst, and focus on this for the interview.
B. Reexperiencing the Traumatic Event
After it was over, did you find yourself persistently remembering or dreaming about the events over
and over again for at least one month?
No Yes
Did this happen even when you were not trying to remember?
No Yes
2
Initials ID# Date Visit # Age Sex Race
STRUCTURED INVERVIEW FOR PTSD (SIP)
THE TIME PERIOD WILL USUALLY BE THE PAST WEEK. IT CAN BE ADJUSTED IF THE
PURPOSE OF THE INTERVIEW IS FOR WORST EVER OF TO ASSESS DIAGNOSIS, FOR
WHICH A 4 WEEK PERIOD OF SIMULTANEOUS SYMPTOMS IS REQUIRED.
A. Trauma
B1 Have you experienced painful images, thoughts or memories of the trauma which you could not get out of
your mind even though you may have wanted to?
Have these been recurrent?
0 = not at all
1 = mild: rarely and/or not bothersome
2 = moderate: at least once a week and/or produces some distress
3 = severe: at least 4 times per week or moderately distressing




I would like to ask you about your dreams. Have you had repeated dreams of violence, injury, danger,
combat, death or other theme related to trauma? Were these of actual scenes you were involved in?
Do you recognize people in the dream? Are these dreams of the event? How frequent are these
dreams? Do you wake up sweating or shouting? Trembling? Palpitations? Trouble
breathing? Are the nightmares so bad that your spouse (partner) does not sleep in the same bed, or in the
same room?
0 = no problems
1 = mild: infrequent or not disruptive
2 = moderate: at least once a week/somewhat distressing
3 = severe: at least four times a week/moderately distressing
4 = extremely severe: six to seven times a week/extremely distressing
Rate past week
B3 Acting or feeling as if event was currently happening
At times have you reacted to something as if you were back in the event? Has it seemed that the event was
recurring or that you were living through it again? Did you have hallucinations of the event?
0 = not at all
1 = rarely/once a week
2 = sometimes/2 - 4 times a week
3 = often/5 - 6 times a week
4 = every day
Rate past week
3
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B4 Psychological distress at exposure to reminders of event(s)
Do any of the symptoms occur or get worse if something reminds you of the stressful event? (Ask about
TV programs, weather conditions, news. Veterans' Day, recent disaster involving loss of life, loss of
good
friends, being in places which remind person of the event). (Feel angry, sad, irritable, anxious, or
frightened?)
0 = not at all
1 = a little bit: infrequent or of questionable significance
2 = somewhat
3 = significantly: several symptoms occur or one symptom with much distress
4 = marked: very distressing, may have activated an episode of the illness, resulting in
hospitalization, different treatment, etc.
Rate past week
B5 Does exposure to an event that reminds you of, or resembles, the event cause you to have any physical
response? (Sweating, trembling, heart racing, nausea, hyperventilating, dizziness etc.)
0 = not at all
1 = a little bit: infrequent or questionable
2 = somewhat: mildly distressing
3 = significantly: causes much distress
4 = marked: very distressing or has sought help from doctors because of the physical
response (e.g., chest pain so severe that patient was sure he or she was having a
heart attack)
Rate past week
C. Avoidance of Stimuli Associated with Trauma
21 Have you tried to avoid thoughts or feelings about the trauma?
0 = no avoidance
1 = mild: of doubtful significance
2 = moderate: definite effort is made, but is able to function at work and socially
3 = severe: definite avoidance which affects life in some way (keeps moving from place to
place/cannot work/works excessively/or episodic substance abuse because of need
to avoid thoughts or feelings)
4 = very severe: dramatic effect on life
Rate past week
nitials ID# Date Visit # Age Sex Race
2 Avoidance of activities that arouse recollection of the event
Have you avoided places, people, conversations or activities that remind you of the event?
0 = no avoidance
1 = mild: of doubtful significance
2 = moderate: definite avoidance of situations
3 = severe: very uncomfortable and avoidance affects life in some way




Is there an important part of the event that you cannot remember?
0 = no problem: remembers everything
1 = mild: remembers most details
2 = moderate: some difficulty remembering significant details
3 = severe: /remembers only a few details
4 = very severe: claims total amnesia for the trauma
Rate past week
4 Loss of interest. Have you experienced less interest (pleasure) in things that you
used to enjoy?
What things have you lost interest in? What do you still enjoy?
0 = no loss of interest
1 = one or two activities less pleasurable
2 = several activities less pleasurable
3 = most activities less pleasurable
4 = almost all activities less pleasurable
Rate past week
5 Detachment/estrangement
Do you have less to do with other people than you used to? Do you feel estranged from other
people?
0 = no problem
1 = feel detached/estranged, but still has normal degree of contact with others
2 = sometimes avoids contact that you would normally participate in
3 = definitely and usually avoids people with whom would previously associate




Initials ID# Date Visit # Age Sex Race
26 Restricted range of affect
Can you have warm feelings/feel close to others? Do you feel numb?
0 = no problem
1 = mild: of questionable significance
2 = moderate: some difficulty expressing feelings
3 = severe: definite problems with expressing feelings
4 = very severe: have no feelings, feels numb most of the time
Rate past week i
21 Foreshortened future
What do you see happening in your future?
What do you visualize as you grow old? What are your expectations of the future?
0 = describes positive or realistic future
1 = mild: describes pessimistic outlook at times, but varies from day to
day depending on events
2 = moderate: pessimistic much of the time
3 = severe: constantly pessimistic




We spoke earlier about nightmares. What about other aspects of sleeping? Have you had any
trouble falling asleep? Do you wake in the middle of the night? Are you able to go back to
sleep after waking?
0 = no loss of sleep
1 = mild: occasional difficulty but no more than two nights/week
2 = moderate: difficulty sleeping at least three nights/week
3 = severe: difficulty sleeping every night
4 = extremely severe: less than 3 hours sleep/night
Rate past week
6
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D2 Have you been more irritable or more easily annoyed than usual?
How did you show your feelings? Have you had angry outbursts?
0 = not at all
1 = mild: occasional feelings of annoyance or anger which may go unnoticed by others
2 = moderate: increased feelings of annoyance, becomes snappy or argumentative (at least
once every 2 weeks); others may have commented
3 = severe: almost constantly irritable or angry/often loses temper or has significant
impairment in ability to relate to others as a result of this
4 = very severe: preoccupied with anger or feelings of retaliation, overtly aggressive or
assualtive/marked impairment in function
Rate past week
D3 Impairment in concentration
Have you noticed any trouble concentrating? Is it hard to keep your mind on things?
Can you pay attention easily? What about reading or watching TV?
0 = no difficulty
1 = patient acknowledges slight problem
2 = patient describes difficulty
3 = interferes with daily activities, job, etc.
4 = constant problems, unable to do simple tasks
Rate past week
D4 Hypervigilance
Do you have to stay on guard? Are you watchful? Do you feel on edge? Do you have to sit with your back
to the wall?
0 = no problem
1 = mild: occasionaL/not disruptive
2 = moderate: causes discomfort/feels on edge or watchful in some situations
3 = severe: causes discomfort/feels on edge or watchful in most situations
4 = very severe: causes extreme discomfort and alters life (feels constantly on guard/must
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D5 Startle
Do you startle easily? Do you have a tendency to jump? Is this a problem after unexpected noise, or
if you hear or see something that reminds you of the original trauma?
0 = no problem
1 = mild: occasional/not disruptive
2 = moderate: causes definite discomfort or an exaggerated startle response at least every 2
weeks
3 = severe: happens more than once a week
4 = extremely severe: so bad that patient cannot function at work or socially
Rate past week
E. How long has this condition lasted?
11 Did the symptoms which you have described last for at least four weeks?
12 How many months after the trauma did these symptoms first develop?
13 Age at the time symptoms began.
In the interviewer's judgment, and taking into account the subject responses, has the disturbance caused




























fotal (B, C, D) _____
SCORE SHEET FOR STRUCTURED PTSD INTERVIEW
rotal (past week or other designated period) score for all B, C, and D items.
Total
score No as 1, Yes as 2 to all answers below
OSM-IV Diagnosis
Traumatic event definitely present?
At least one item from category B with score of at least 2
At least three items from category C with score of at least 2 (at least one item must
be from C 1-2 and one must be from C 3-7)
At least two items from category D 1-5 (each must score at least 2)
Diagnosis?
9
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Information sheet for participants
The Effects of Previous Dental Experiences on Current Dental Fears.
We invite you to participate in a research project. However, before you decide
whether or not to participate, we need to be sure that you understand firstly why we
are doing it, and secondly what it would involve if you agree to participate. We are
therefore providing you with the following information. Read it carefully and be sure
to ask any questions you have. If you do have any further questions or would like
more information please do not hesitate to contact either Mandy Forbes or Dr. Pauline
McGoldrick at the Department ofClinical Psychology, Ninewells Hospital (Tel 01382
425612) or Dundee Dental Hospital and School (Tel 01382 425760)
The Study
As someone who has been referred for help with dental treatment because you are
worried about it, you have been chosen as a possible participant in this study. The aim
of the study is to gain a better understanding of the effects of previous dental
experiences and how these now relate to your current fears. It is hoped that any
results from the research will help us have a greater understanding of the treatment
needs of patients with dental anxiety.
What you would be asked to do
Participating in the study would involve you answering some questions regarding
your past dental experiences. Then you would be asked to complete a number of short
questionnaires. The research is being conducted at Dundee Dental Hospital and in
total the appointment will take approximately 40 minutes to one hour. All
information given to the researchers will be treated as confidential and will be
password protected however we are required to advise your General Practitioner of
your involvement in the study.
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you are free to refuse to take part
or to withdraw from the study at any time without having to give a reason and without
this affecting your future dental care or your relationship with the dental staff looking
after you.
The Tayside Committee on Medical Research Ethics that has responsibility for
scrutinising all proposals for medical research on humans in Tayside has examined
the proposal and has raised no objections from the point of view of medical ethics.
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